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While much research has been conducted into the political behavior and attitudes 
of American military officers, little has been accomplished with respect to enlisted 
personnel.  Most reports assume that the American military identify largely with the 
Republican Party and are mostly conservative in attitude.  The most recent large-scale 
study, the TISS Survey on the Military in the Post Cold War Era conducted by Feaver 
and Kohn in 1998-1999, confirmed those assumptions among senior officers and is often 
quoted as representative of the entire military.  However, the demographic characteristics 
of enlisted personnel predict different behavior.  The enlisted ranks of the American 
military are over-represented by minorities who traditionally identify with the 
Democratic Party.  The present study gathered data on enlisted personnel, by means of a 
 ix
survey, to determine whether that specialized population is significantly different in 
attitude and behavior from that of the officer corps and of the general American 
population.  Enlisted personnel identify with the Republican Party in about the same 
proportion as do the general American population.  However, only about half as many 
enlisted personnel identify with the Democratic Party as do civilians.  Enlisted personnel 
are also about three times more likely to identify as Independents as do other Americans.   
Active-duty enlisted personnel demonstrate a 1.7 to 1 partisan (Republican to 
Democrat) ratio, similar to that found in the veteran enlisted sample (1.8 to 1) and the 
officer sample (1.6 to 1).  The civilian sample shows a .95 to 1 partisan ratio.  Thus, 
active-duty enlisted personnel who identify with a political party are about twice as likely 
to identify with the Republican Party as are civilians.  However, active-duty enlisted 
personnel are nearly four times as likely as civilians to report being Independent, and are 
substantially less likely than civilians to identify with the Democratic Party.  The 
Republican to Democrat ratio may well explain the commentary about and observations 
of a Republican dominated military.  Despite the fact that the overall proportion of 
Republicans within the military is no greater than that found within the general 
population, that there are twice as many individuals who will state that they are 
Republicans as those who will state that they are Democrats can easily give the 
impression of a heavily Republican population.  However, active-duty enlisted personnel 
remain strongly independent when compared to the civilian population.  Of special note 
is a markedly higher political efficacy among military enlisted personnel than is found 
within the general American population. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Recent events have made the American military a population of increasing 
interest to political scientists, military historians, political sociologists, and other writers.  
The highly publicized and apparently successful use of force by the American military 
in 1991 against Iraq in Operation Desert Storm highlighted a new prowess reestablished 
after the embarrassment of Vietnam.  Then, with the heavily military nature of the 
response to the events of September 11, 2001, and the quick and successful toppling of 
the Taliban government in Afghanistan, the issue of whether the American military was 
the most competent force in the world, and an institution that was highly regarded by the 
public, appeared sealed.  The increased use of the National Guard and Reserve forces on 
active combat duty has most likely brought more of the public into direct contact with 
the military and seems to indicate that the military’s public profile, whether positive or 
negative, is unlikely to diminish in the near future. 
Several specific developments raise a set of potentially troubling issues.  In the 
1990s, concern began to grow in journalistic and academic civil-military circles that a 
"gap" existed in political attitudes and behavior between the American populace and the 
military (Ricks 1997; Holsti 1998, 1999, 2001).  Extensive research into the attitudes 
and behavior of the officer corps and civilian elites confirmed the existence of a 
separation between civilian thinking and that of military personnel.  However, despite all 
previous work and assumptions, little research has been conducted into the political 









military population, an inadequate understanding of those personnel results in a lack of 
understanding of the military as a whole.  Since the enlisted population is significantly 
different demographically from both the officer corps and the general population, and 
since, as we will see, this group is apparently voting at a higher rate than Americans as a 
whole, they are manifestly a population worth studying. 
The 2000 Presidential election was highlighted by the controversy in Florida 
over whether or not certain overseas absentee ballots, most of which were from military 
voters, could be counted.  The Democratic Party’s initial strategy to encourage the 
disqualification of those ballots indicated an assumption that those votes were 
disproportionately in favor of the Republican candidate.  This, combined with research 
showing that overseas absentee ballots are significantly more likely than domestic 
absentee ballots to be disqualified by local election boards (Alvarez et.al., 2007, US 
GAO 2001), brings into question exactly how the military does vote and whether, as 
commentary in the civil-military field might suggest, the military population may 
possibly be a critical voting group, if not a bloc (Inbody 2008).  Republican politicians 
appear to assume that the military will vote largely in their favor, at least in presidential 
elections.  Democrats, on the other hand, are accused of “tone deafness” toward the 
military vote (Feaver 2004). 
With the creation of the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in 2002, the 
first joint combatant command with primary military authority and responsibility within 
the borders of the United States, the possibility of domestic use of the military in the 









emerged for the first time since the Civil War.  In September 2008, NORTHCOM 
announced that, for the first time, a specific Army unit was assigned to its command for 
use within the borders of the United States (U.S. Northern Command 2008).  This poses 
obvious questions of civil-military relations.  If we are to understand better the dynamics 
of civil-military relations in day-to-day operations and whether or not such new issues 
and organizations pose any threat to the proper functioning of a democratic society, it 
has become crucial that we know as much as possible about the nature of the personnel 
who make up the vast majority of the American military.   
* * * * *  
This study is designed to explore the apparent contradiction between reported 
political attitudes and behavior of American military enlisted personnel and those that 
are predicted by demographics.  The history of military voting at least since the 
American Civil War, as well as more recent observations, suggests that the party 
identification of military personnel leans toward the Republican Party.  The 
demographics of the American military would not tend to support such a proposition, 
however.  We know that minority groups, which, in the general population, traditionally 
identify with the Democratic Party, are disproportionately represented in the U.S. 
military (Kane 2005, 2006; Watkins 2008; Inbody 2008).  Given such over-
representation, a question arises as to whether the assumptions mentioned here about a 
Republican bias within the military are in fact accurate.   
Without a comprehensive study of enlisted personnel, the extent to which the 









identification is an open question.  While the political behavior and attitudes of officers, 
especially senior officers, are understood quite well, at least as recently as 1998 (Feaver 
& Kohn 2001), enlisted personnel have not been the subject of research to any great 
extent other than in some sociological studies (Moskos 1970; Ingraham 1984; Bachman 
1997, 2000; Segal et al. 2001).  To assume that the attitudes and culture of enlisted 
personnel are but a reflection of those held by the officer corps and particularly of senior 
officers would be a mistake and would ignore many years of commentary, observation, 
and academic study. 
The assumption that military personnel tend to vote for Republican candidates is 
inconsistent with what we would expect if we extrapolate from the overall demographics 
of American voting behavior to that of the military.  If, particularly within the enlisted 
ranks, a bias does exist within the American military toward Republican Party 
identification, then it may be that, as to the military, demographics are not the usually 
reliable predictor of political behavior that they are for the civilian population.  If that is 
the case, the unpredicted political behavior of military personnel warrants inquiry into 
its causes and the reasons for the irregularity. 
The enlisted ranks of the American military have always made up the largest 
portion of the military population.  However, officers, given their position as decision-
making elites in most societies, have more often been the subject of study by political 
scientists.  Huntington (1957), in his seminal study of American civil-military relations, 
relegated enlisted personnel to the status of tradesmen and reserved the title of “military 









back seat.  However, it is a mistake to dismiss the significance of enlisted personnel so 
quickly, because they make up some 85 percent of the total strength of the American 
military.  Of the approximately 1.4 million men and women wearing the uniform of the 
United States, about 1.1 million of them are enlisted personnel, and one should attend to 
them through detailed study. 
There has been traditionally a social divide between enlisted personnel and 
officers.  Officers are either “commissioned” by the President or given a “warrant” of 
service by Secretary of their branch of service.  Such commissions and warrants have no 
time limit and the holder of such a document remains on service until the individual 
officer is released by the government or resigns.  Enlisted personnel, by contrast, sign an 
enlistment contract for a set period of service, at the end of which they are free to return 
to civilian life.  The terminology used to describe the process of proceeding from one 
rank to the next is also different for officers and enlisted personnel.  Officers are 
“promoted.”  Enlisted personnel “advance.”  Officers are always saluted by juniors.  
Enlisted personnel, regardless of rank, are never saluted. 
The structure of the enlisted ranks is more complicated than that of officers, 
revealing a tradesman-like specialization of personnel into specific areas of expertise 
and technical training.  Although each service has a unique enlisted rank structure, all of 
the services have a common “pay-grade” structure that makes comparison between them 
possible.  A Private First Class in the Army, a Seaman in the Navy, a Lance Corporal in 
the Marine Corps, and an Airman First Class in the Air Force are all in  E-3 pay-grade.  









The demographic composition of the enlisted force is also different from that of 
the officer corps.  It is different from that of the American population as well.  If the 
American military presented an accurate descriptive representation of the U.S. 
population, by definition it would mirror the characteristics of the American population 
and, by extension, its voting demographics.  However, it does neither.  As of December 
2008, while whites made up about 80 percent of the ages 18 to 44 civilian population, 
whites are only about 69 percent of the enlisted population.  Blacks, while just under 12 
percent of civilian 18-44-year-olds, comprised nearly 19 percent of the military 
population.  Thus, relative to all appropriate comparison groups, whites are under-
represented within the enlisted ranks of the American military while blacks are over-
represented.  Among 18-44-year-olds, other racial groups appear in the military in 
roughly the same proportion as they do in the overall population. (See Table 1.1.)  
However, women, who make up over half the American population, represent only 
about 15 percent of all military personnel.  
Table 1.1 U.S. Enlisted Population by Race (Dec 2008)1 
 White Black Other 
Enlisted Force 68.9 18.6 12.5 
Age 18 - 44 80.1 12.6 7.3 
U.S. Population 74.1 13.4 12.5 
                                                 
 
 
1 DOD data obtained from Defense Manpower Data Center, Information Delivery System.  Data retrieved 
on 12 February 2009 from https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/ids/genericsubmit.do?module=1&report=23.  











 That the demographic data of enlisted military personnel are not representative 
of the general American population bears on the “civil-military gap” debate and the 
relationship between it and the nature of the American military.  At question in the 
debate is whether military personnel hold attitudes significantly different from the U.S. 
population as a whole, and if so, whether those differences pose any danger to the ideal 
of civilian control of the military.  
Claims that the military is populated by members from the economically poorest 
backgrounds and that the children of the rich do not enlist contribute to the notion that 
the economically and politically disadvantaged are doing the “dirty work” of the 
advantaged.  This recently prompted a call by one member of Congress to reinstitute the 
draft, based on the claim that conscription is necessary to ensure that military service is 
equally shared across the entirety of American society (Rangel 2006a; Youngblood 
2009).  
 The notion of a gap between the norms and attitudes of the general population 
and those of the U.S. military has been discussed in some depth for at least the past five 
or six decades.  The debate, initiated by Huntington (1957), who argued that a gap must 
necessarily exist in order to ensure the best military protection of society, and Janowitz 
(1960), who argued that specific steps must be taken to ensure there is no gap, continues 
unabated today within journalistic, academic, and military circles. 
The divides that developed between civil and military society during and 









norms.  The end of the draft began a slow process of creating a military that was 
increasingly segregated from civilian society.  New norms of behavior, which essentially 
ended illegal drug use in the military, further created a sense of departure from the 
apparent norms of civil society.  The continuing decline in military experience among 
the American population as well as members of Congress raises questions about how 
much of the decision-making elite and the electorate has any direct contact with the 
active-duty military personnel who actually fight the nation’s wars (Powell et al. 1994; 
Ricks 1997; Cohn 1999). 
The controversy surrounding the fate of overseas military absentee ballots in the 
2000 presidential election in Florida, marked by the Democratic Party’s initial strategy 
to encourage the disqualification of those ballots in Florida, highlighted an assumption 
that those votes were disproportionately in favor of the Republican candidate.  The 
Republican Party’s reaction, to insist that all of the ballots be counted, indicated a 
similar assumption on their part.   
Controversy over the handling of the military vote, rather than being resolved 
after the 2000 election, has increased in recent years.  In particular, how absentee ballots 
are distributed, returned, handled, and counted by election authorities has been at the 
center of growing attention on the part of military and civilian governmental officials as 
well as the press.  The assumptions generated by the Florida presidential election in 
2000 provide the most notable case, but concerns over military voting have since 
become a recurring phenomenon, with instances reported in the 2004, 2006, and 2008 









2008).  Given that a high percentage of the overseas absentee ballots come from active-
duty military personnel and their families, such issues raise questions as to how absentee 
ballots are treated by various state laws and how they are handled by local election 
officials.   
Recent research shows that overseas absentee ballots are significantly more 
likely than domestic absentee ballots to be disqualified by local election boards (Alvarez 
et.al. 2007; US GAO 2001).  Watchdog groups such as the National Defense Committee 
have begun to monitor how military personnel are treated by various localities with 
respect to the right to vote and are taking legal action to enforce their rights under the 
Uniformed and Overseas Citizen Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA). 
This activity surrounding the enfranchisement of military personnel naturally 
begs the question of exactly how the military does vote and, as some commentary in the 
civil-military field has suggested, whether the military population may possibly be a 
critical voting group, at least locally (Tiron 2008; Stiehm 2008; Inbody 2008).  To date, 
however, there have been no detailed studies of the political attitudes and behavior of 
American military enlisted personnel.  Some surveys published in the press have 
indicated that enlisted personnel strongly support Republican administrations, but all 
such surveys have been limited to the readership of Military Times newspapers and are 
recognized to be limited in scope and overall accuracy (Trowbridge 2004).  Other 
surveys by the more well-known polling organizations have limited their surveying to 









Just as it is a mistake to assume that the attitudes of officers and enlisted 
personnel are the same, it is also an error to assume that the two populations vote alike.  
A simulation of the 2000 presidential election conducted within the ranks of the 
American military highlighted this difference.  This election simulation, a preliminary 
study for this dissertation, divided the September 2001 end-strength of the U.S. military 
into six groups: White Male, White Female, Black Male, Black Female, Other Male, and 
Other Female.  Then, using data about the voting behavior of each demographic 
subgroup from the 2000 general election American National Election Study (ANES), a 
prediction of how many military personnel would vote for each of the candidates was 
calculated.  It demonstrated that, had each demographic grouping within the military 
divided its vote as had the same group in the general population, 54.4 percent would 
have voted for Al Gore and 42.2 percent would have voted for George W. Bush, a 1.2 to 
1 vote in favor of the Democratic Party’s candidate (Inbody 2008).   
 This outcome for a military population generally assumed to have a Republican 
bias is at least cause to look with more detail at the political attitudes and behavior of 
those in uniform.  Either observers hold incorrect assumptions about the politics of the 
American military or demographic characteristics do not predict voting behavior in this 
special population with the expected reliability we have come to associate with studies 













In order to resolve the apparent contradiction of a Republican, conservative 
military that is over-represented by minority groups that normally identify with the 
Democratic Party, this research will specifically aim to provide answers to two 
questions: 
1. To what extent do the political attitudes and behavior of enlisted personnel 
differ from or resemble those of the officer corps and the general American 
population? 
2. If enlisted personnel do identify more with the Republican Party than does 




In order to obtain the data necessary to answer the questions raised above, a 
survey was developed using questions from the Triangle Institute Surveys on the 
Military in the Post-Cold War Era and from the American National Election Study, 
along with others developed by the author.  The survey was delivered to potential 
respondents both electronically and manually.  Responses were taken over the six month 
period surrounding the November 2008 national election. 
Data obtained from the use of the Survey on Enlisted Personnel (SOEP) and 









differences and similarities between various groups.  The active-duty enlisted force was 
compared to veteran enlisted personnel, the general U.S. population, and the officer 
corps.  The details of the survey instrument and methodology will be discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
The results revealed a population that is much closer in behavior and identity to 
the general American population than had previously been reported and showed the 
group to hold more liberal social attitudes than might be expected.  The data showed that 
the average American enlisted person is highly motivated to serve, but believes that the 
American people do not really understand the sacrifices that military personnel make on 
behalf of society.  Enlisted personnel reveal themselves highly motivated to vote, likely 
to participate politically, and quite aware of and with opinions on various important 
civil-military relations issues.   
ORGANIZATION OF DISSERTATION 
 
The present study will be presented in the following manner.  The theoretical 
background of the American civil-military debate will be presented in Chapter 2.  The 
chapter will conclude with a detailed exploration of the cultural gap debate and how that 
debate bears on this study.  Chapter 3 will concentrate on the demographic 
characteristics of enlisted personnel, including not only racial/ethnic and gender data, 
but the educational, socio-economic, and regional backgrounds of the enlisted 
population.  Then, given the recent controversy about whether military personnel have 









will discuss what is known about military voting behavior, the military’s propensity to 
vote, and the controversy over absentee balloting.  These three chapters – civil-military 
relations theory, military demographics, and military voting – lay out the substantial and 
scholarly foundations upon which the study is based.  The method for discovering the 
data necessary to provide answers to the questions posed earlier in this chapter will be 
laid out in Chapter 5.  In that chapter a description of the survey instrument will be 
presented along with details of the survey sample.  Chapter 6 will provide a description 
of the findings of the survey divided into several categories: party identification, 
political attitudes, and various military, civil-military, and social issues.  Chapter 7 will 











Chapter 2:  American Civil-Military Relations 
 
The research questions for this project are derived from observations about 
whether or not a gap in partisanship and ideology exists between civilian and military 
cultures, more specifically with respect to enlisted personnel.  The theoretical debate and 
critical concern have centered less on whether such a gap ought to exist, but rather 
whether it is possible for the gap to be too wide, because too large a gap might threaten 
effective civilian control of the military.  
This chapter will explore the theories that explain the importance of 
understanding the similarities and differences between the civilian and military worlds.  
First, what did the founding fathers think about civil-military relations and what insights 
are gained into their ideas by reviewing the Federalist Papers?  Then, what are the 
principal theoretical debates in the field that explain the different aspects of American 
civil-military relations, and, in particular, what do the works of Huntington (1957) and 
Janowitz (1960) reveal?  What are the important characteristics of the military and 
civilian worlds and what are the primary issues that drive and constrain relations 
between them? 
The next section will start with an examination of the “Cold War Puzzle,” the 
failure of Huntington’s theory to explain adequately what actually occurred in American 
civil-military relations, and the resultant agency theory alternative.  Then, after a glance 
at issues arising from the Vietnam War, the chapter will explore the so-called “Post-
Cold War Crisis” with an in-depth look at the literature of the apparent “culture gap” 









LIBERAL THEORY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 
 
At the heart of civil-military relations is the problem of how a civilian 
government can control and remain safe from the military institution it created for its 
own protection.  A military force that is strong enough to do what is asked of it must not 
also pose a danger to the controlling government.  This poses the paradox that “because 
we fear others we create an institution of violence to protect us, but then we fear the very 
institution we created for protection” (Feaver 1996b). 
The solution to this problem throughout most of American history was to keep 
its standing army small.  While armed forces were built up during wartime, the pattern 
after every war up to and including World War II was to demobilize quickly and return 
to something approaching pre-war force levels.  However, with the advent of the Cold 
War in the 1950s, the need to create and maintain a sizable peacetime military force 
engendered new concerns of militarism and about how such a large force would affect 
civil-military relations in the United States.  For the first time in American history, the 
problem of civil-military relations would have to be managed during peacetime. 
 The men who wrote the Constitution of the United States were fearful of large 
standing armies, legislatures that had too much power, and perhaps most of all, a 
powerful executive who might be able to wage war on his own authority.  All were 
objects of concern because of the dangers each posed to liberal democracy and a free 
citizenry.  While it is often impossible to “gauge accurately the intent of the Framers” 
(Brennan 2005), it is nevertheless important to understand the motivations and concerns 









authority.  The Federalist Papers provide a helpful view of how they understood the 
relationship between civil authority, as represented by the executive branch and the 
legislature, and military authority. 
 In Federalist No. 8, Alexander Hamilton worried that maintaining a large 
standing army would be a dangerous and expensive undertaking.  In his principal 
argument for the ratification of the proposed constitution, he argued that only by 
maintaining a strong union could the new country avoid such a pitfall.  Using the 
European experience as a negative example and the British experience as a positive one, 
he presented the idea of a strong nation protected by a navy with no need of a standing 
army.  The implication was that control of a large military force is, at best, difficult and 
expensive, and at worst invites war and division.  He foresaw the necessity of creating a 
civilian government that kept the military at a distance. 
 James Madison, another writer of several of the Federalist Papers, expressed his 
concern about a standing military in comments before the Constitutional Convention in 
June 1787: 
In time of actual war, great discretionary powers are constantly 
given to the Executive Magistrate.  Constant apprehension of 
War, has the same tendency to render the head too large for the 
body.  A standing military force, with an overgrown Executive, 
will not long be safe companions to liberty.  The means of 
defense against foreign danger, have been always the instruments 
of tyranny at home.  Among the Romans it was a standing maxim 
to excite a war, whenever a revolt was apprehended.  Throughout 
all Europe, the armies kept up under the pretext of defending, 
have enslaved the people.  (Farrand 1911, 1:465) 
 
 The Constitution placed considerable limitations on the legislature.  Coming 









proposed Constitution would place so many limitations on the legislature that it would 
become impossible for such a body to prevent an executive from starting a war.  
Hamilton argued in Federalist No. 26 that it would be equally as bad for a legislature to 
be unfettered by any other agency and that restraints would actually be more likely to 
preserve liberty.  James Madison, in Federalist No. 47, continued Hamilton’s argument 
that distributing powers among the various branches of government would prevent any 
one group from gaining so much power as to become unassailable.  In Federalist No. 48, 
however, Madison warned that while the separation of powers is important, the 
departments must not be so far separated as to have no ability to control the others.   
Finally, in Federalist No. 51, Madison argued that to create a government that 
relied primarily on the good nature of the incumbent to ensure proper government was 
folly.  Institutions must be in place to check incompetent or malevolent leaders.  Most 
importantly, no single branch of government ought to have control over any single 
aspect of governing.  Thus, all three branches of government must have some control 
over the military, and the system of checks and balances maintained among the other 
branches would server to help control the military. 
Hamilton and Madison thus had two major concerns: (1) the detrimental effect 
on liberty and democracy of a large standing army and (2) the ability of an unchecked 
legislature or executive to take the country to war precipitously.  These concerns drove 
American military policy for the first century and a half of the country’s existence.  
Until the 1950s, the maintenance of a large military force by the United States was an 









and including World War II, the military was quickly demobilized and reduced to near 
pre-war levels. 
INSTITUTIONAL AND CONVERGENCE THEORIES 
 
In 1945, the United States began a demobilization of the massive military force 
that had been built up during World War II.  Strong public and bipartisan pressure 
succeeded in forcing the government to bring American soldiers home and to reduce the 
size of the armed forces quickly.  Strikes and even some rioting by military personnel at 
overseas bases in January 1946 pressured President Truman to continue the process 
despite growing concern about the Soviet Union and an increasing recognition that the 
United States was not going to be able to retreat into the isolationism of the pre-war 
years.  Attempts in Congress to continue conscription to provide a trained reserve as a 
replacement for a large standing military force failed and, in 1947, the World War II 
draft law expired (Pollard 1985; Chambers 1987; Flynn 2000). 
By the summer of 1950, the armed forces of the United States had fewer than 1.5 
million personnel on active duty, down from a high of 12 million in 1945.  By the next 
year, however, in response to North Korea’s invasion of South Korea, the size of the 
U.S. military was again on the rise, doubling to more than 3.2 million personnel.  
Reaching a high of 3.6 million in 1953, the total number of personnel on active duty in 
the U.S. military never again dropped below two million during the 40-plus years of the 









size of the active-duty force had, by 1999, dropped to just under 1.4 million personnel.  
As of February 28, 2009, a total of 1,398,378 men and women remain on active duty. 
The size of the U.S. military in the latter half of the twentieth century, 
unprecedented in peacetime, caused concern in some circles, primarily as to the potential 
effect of maintaining such a large force in a democratic society.  Some predicted disaster 
and were concerned with the growing militarization of American society.  These writers 
were quite sure that a distinctly military culture was inherently dangerous to a non-
militaristic liberal society (Buck 1949; Cook 1962; Horowitz 1963; Coffin 1964; 
Swomley 1964; Knoll and McFadden 1969; Hayes 1973).  Others warned that the 
ascendancy of the military establishment would fundamentally change American foreign 
policy and would weaken the intellectual fabric of the country (Mills 1956, 1958).  
However, most of the arguments were less apocalyptic and settled along two tracks.  The 
two tracks, highlighted, respectively, by Samuel P. Huntington’s Soldier and the State 
and Morris Janowitz’s The Professional Soldier.   
The debate focused primarily on the nature of the relationship between the 
civilian and military worlds.  There was widespread agreement that there were two 
distinct worlds and that they were fundamentally different from one another.  The 
argument was over how best to ensure that the two could coexist without endangering 
liberal democracy. 
Institutional Theory.  Huntington (1957) described the differences between the 
two worlds as a contrast between the attitudes and values held by military personnel, 









al. 1971; Hayes 1973).  Each world consisted of a separate institution with its own 
operative rules and norms.  The military’s function was furthermore inherently different 
from that of the civilian world.  Given a more conservative military world which was 
illiberal in many aspects, it was necessary to find a method of ensuring that the liberal 
civilian world would be able to maintain its dominance over the military world.  
Huntington’s answer to this problem was “military professionalism.” 
Huntington focused his study on the officer corps.  He first defined a profession 
and explained that enlisted personnel, while certainly part of the military world, are not, 
strictly speaking, professionals.  He relegated them to the role of tradesmen or skilled 
craftsmen, necessary but not professionals in his definition of the term.  It was 
professional military officers, not the enlisted technicians of the trade of violence, or 
even part-time or amateur reserve officers, who would be the key to controlling the 
military world. 
Professionalizing the military, or at least the officer corps, which is the decision-
making authority within the military world, emphasizes the useful aspects of that 
institution such as discipline, structure, order, and self-sacrifice.  It also isolates the 
corps in a specialized arena in which the military professionals would be recognized as 
experts in the use of force.  As recognized experts not subject to the interference of the 
civilian world, the military's officer corps would willingly submit itself to civil authority.  
In Huntington’s words, such an arrangement maintained a "focus on a politically neutral, 









In order for the civilian authority to maintain control, it needed to have a way to 
direct the military without unduly infringing on the prerogatives of the military world 
and thus provoking a backlash.  Civilian leadership would decide the objective of any 
military action but then leave it to the military world to decide upon the best way of 
achieving the objective.  The problem facing civilian authority, then, is in deciding on 
the ideal amount of control.  Too much control over the military could result in a force 
too weak to defend the nation, resulting in failure on the battlefield.  Too little control 
would create the possibility of a coup, i.e., failure of the government. 
Huntington’s answer to the control dilemma was “objective civilian control.”  
This was in contrast to “subjective control,” in which direction would be more intrusive 
and detailed. To put it simply, the more “objective civilian control,” the more military 
security.  Civilian control, then, is the independent variable for the subsequent 
dependent variable of military effectiveness.  
If civilian control is the critical variable for military effectiveness, it begs the 
question of how civilian control is then to be determined.  Huntington identified two 
shaping forces or imperatives for civilian control –  (1) functional and (2) societal.  He 
broke the societal imperative into two components, ideology and structure.  By ideology, 
he meant a world-view or paradigm: liberal anti-military, conservative pro-military, 
fascist pro-military, and Marxist anti-military.  By structure, he meant the legal-
constitutional framework that guided political affairs generally and civil-military affairs 









If Huntington’s imperatives are the independent variables, then the variable of 
civilian control becomes in turn an explanatory variable for military security.  However, 
Huntington says that both societal imperatives, ideology and structure, are unchanging, 
at least in the American case.  If that is the case, then the functional imperative is fully 
explanatory for changes in civilian control and subsequently military security.  In short, 
if external threats are low, liberal ideology “extirpates” or eliminates military forces.  If 
external threats are high, liberal ideology produces a “transmutation” effect that will re-
create the military in accordance with liberalism, but in such a form that it will lose its 
“peculiarly military characteristics.”  Transmutation will work for short periods, such as 
to fight a war, but will not, over time, assure military security (Feaver, 1996).  This 
appears to explain well the pattern of American militarization and demobilization, at 
least until the initiation of the Cold War. 
With the understanding that the rise of the Soviet Union created a long-term 
threat, Huntington concluded that the liberal society of the United States would fail to 
create adequate military forces to ensure security over the long term.  The only 
circumstance he could foresee that would permit adequate military security was for the 
United States to change the societal imperative.  “The tension between the demands of 
military security and the values of American liberalism can, in the long run, be relieved 
only by the weakening of the security threat or the weakening of liberalism” 
(Huntington 1957, 457).  The only way the United States could adequately provide 
security in the face of a long-term threat such as the Soviet Union, in other words, was 









 Convergence Theory.  The other principal thread within the civil-military 
theoretical debate was that generated in 1960 by Morris Janowitz in The Professional 
Soldier.  Janowitz agreed with Huntington that separate military and civilian worlds 
existed, but differed from his predecessor regarding the ideal solution for preventing 
danger to liberal democracy.  Since the military world as he saw it was fundamentally 
conservative, it would resist change and not adapt as rapidly as the more open and 
unstructured civilian society to changes in the world.  Thus, according to Janowitz, the 
military would benefit from exactly what Huntington argued against – outside 
intervention. 
Janowitz introduced a theory of convergence, arguing that the military, despite 
the extremely slow pace of change, was in fact changing even without external pressure.  
Convergence theory postulated either a civilianization of the military or a militarization 
of society (Lyons 1961; Horowitz 1963; Wool 1968; Knoll and McFadden 1969; Hayes 
1973.)  However, despite this convergence, Janowitz insisted that the military world 
would retain certain essential differences from the civilian and that it would remain 
recognizably military in nature (Janowitz 1973). 
Janowitz agreed with Huntington that, because of the fundamental differences 
between the civilian and military worlds, clashes would develop which would diminish 
the goal of civilian control of the military.  His answer was to ensure that convergence 
occurred, thus ensuring that the military world would be imbued with the norms and 
expectations of the society that created it.  He encouraged use of conscription, which 









of more Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs to ensure that the military 
academies did not have a monopoly on the type of officer in the military services.  He 
specifically encouraged the development of ROTC programs in the more elite 
universities so that the broader influences of society would be represented by the officer 
corps.  The more such societal influences present within the military culture, the smaller 
the attitudinal differences between the two worlds and the greater the chance of civilians 
maintaining control over the military.  Janowitz, like Huntington, believed that the 
civilian and military worlds were different from one another; while Huntington 
developed a theory to control the difference, Janowitz developed a theory to diminish 
the difference. 
In response to Huntington’s position on the functional imperative, Janowitz 
concluded that in the new nuclear age, the United States was going to have to be able to 
deliver both strategic deterrence and an ability to participate in limited wars.  Such a 
regime, new in American history, was going to require a new military self-conception, 
the constabulary concept: “[T]he military establishment becomes a constabulary force 
when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and 
seeks viable international relations, rather than victory…" (Janowitz 1960, 418; Feaver 
1996).  Under this new concept of the military establishment, distinctions between war 
and peace are more difficult to draw.  The military, instead of viewing itself as a fire 
company to be called out in emergency, would then be required to imagine itself in the 
role of a police force, albeit on the international level rather than domestically.  The role 









new and higher standard of professional military education, one that would ensure that 
military professionals were more closely attuned to the ideals and norms of civilian 
society. 
VIETNAM, THE COLD WAR PUZZLE, AND THE AGENCY THEORY ALTERNATIVE 
 
The Vietnam War opened deep arguments about civil-military relations that 
remain powerful influences today.  One centered on a contention within military circles 
that the United States lost the war because of unnecessary civilian meddling in military 
matters.  It was argued that the civilian leadership failed to understand how to use 
military force and improperly restrained the use of force in achieving victory.  Among 
the first to analyze the war critically using Clausewitz as the theoretical basis, Summers 
(1984) argued that the principal reason for the loss of the Vietnam War was a failure on 
the part of the leadership to understand the goal, which was victory.  The Army, always 
successful on the battlefield, ultimately did not achieve victory because it was misused 
and misunderstood.  Summers demonstrated how the conduct of the war violated many 
classical principals as described by Clausewitz (1989), thereby contributing to failure.  
He ended his analysis with a “quintessential strategic lesson learned”: that the Army 
must become “masters of the profession of arms,” thus reinforcing an idea along the 
lines of Huntington’s argument for strengthening military professionalism. 
McMaster (1997) observed that it was easier for officers in the Gulf War to 
connect national policy to the actual fighting than was the case during Vietnam.  He 









fighting occurred, due to a fundamental failure on the part of the civilian and military 
actors involved to argue the issues adequately.  McMaster, who urged a more direct 
debate between civilians and the military on defense policy and actions, and Summers, 
who argued for a clear separation between civilians and the military, both pointed out 
controversies over the proper roles of civilian and military leaders. 
Despite those controversies and the apparent lessons learned from the Vietnam 
War, some theorists recognized a significant problem with Huntington’s theory insofar 
as it appears to question the notion of a separate, apolitical professional military.  While 
there is little argument that separate civilian and military worlds exist, there is 
significant debate about the proper interaction between the two.  As discussed above, 
Huntington proposed that the ideal arrangement was one whereby civilian political 
leaders provided objective control to the military leadership and then stepped back to 
permit the experts in violence to do what was most effective.  He further stated that the 
most dangerous arrangement was one whereby civilian leaders intruded extensively in 
the military world, creating a situation whereby the military leadership was not 
politically neutral and security of the nation was thus threatened both by an ineffective 
military and by provoking the military to avoid taking orders (Huntington 1957).  
Arguably, however, and despite Huntington's urging otherwise, U.S. civilian 
leadership had been intrusive in its control over the military, not only during the 
Vietnam War, but also during much of the Cold War.  During that time, the military elite 









yet the United States had managed to emerge successfully from the Cold War.  Despite 
that, none of Huntington’s more dire predictions had proven true.   
In response to this apparent “puzzle,” Feaver (1996, 2003) laid out an agency 
theory of civil-military relations, which he argued should replace Huntington’s 
institutional theory.  Taking a rationalist approach, he used a principal-agent framework, 
drawn from microeconomics, to explore how actors in a superior position influence 
those in a subordinate role.  He used the concepts of “working” and “shirking” to 
explain the actions of the subordinate.  In his construct, the principal is the civilian 
leadership that has the responsibility of establishing policy.  The agent is the military 
that will work – carry out the designated task – or shirk – evading the principal’s wishes 
and carrying out actions that further the military’s own interests.  Shirking at its worst 
may be disobedience, but Feaver includes such things as “foot-dragging” and leaks to 
the press. 
The problem for the principal is how to ensure that the agent is doing what the 
principal wants done.  Agency theory predicts that if the costs of monitoring the agent 
are low, the principal will use intrusive methods of control.  Intrusive methods include, 
for the executive branch, such things as inspections, reports, reviews of military plans, 
and detailed control of the budget, and for Congress, committee oversight hearings and 
requiring routine reports.  For the military agent, if the likelihood that shirking will be 
detected by the civilian principal is high or if the perceived costs of being punished are 









Feaver argued that his theory was different from other theories or models in that 
it was purely deductive, based on democratic theory rather than on anecdotal evidence, 
and better enabled analysis of day-to-day decisions and actions on the part of the civilian 
and military leadership (Feaver 2003; Owens 2003).  It operated at the intersection of 
Huntington’s institutional approach and Janowitz’s sociological point of view.  
Huntington concentrated on the relationship between civilian leadership and the military 
qua institution while Janowitz focused on the relationship of the military qua individuals 
to American society.  Agency theory provided a link between the two enabling an 
explanation of how civil-military relations work on a day-to-day basis.  Specifically, 
agency theory would predict that the result of a regime of intrusive monitoring by the 
civilian leadership combined with shirking on the part of the military would result in the 
highest levels of civil-military conflict.  Feaver (1998) suggested that post-Cold War 
developments had so profoundly reduced the perceived costs of monitoring and reduced 
the perceived expectation of punishment that the  gap between what civilians ask the 
military to do and what the military would prefer to do had increased to unprecedented 
levels. 
THE CULTURE GAP THESIS 
  
Most of the above discussion assumed that a separation between the civilian and 
military world was inevitable and likely necessary.  The argument had been over 
whether to control the gap between the two (Huntington) or to minimize the gap by 









however, the discussion began to focus on the nature of the apparent gap between 
civilian and military cultures and, more specifically, whether that gap had reached such 
proportions as to pose a danger to civilian control of the military.  Part of the debate was 
based on the cultural differences between the more liberal civilian society and the 
conservative military society, and on the recognition that such differences had 
apparently become more pronounced than in past years.   
Alfred Vagts (1937) had already begun the discussion from an historical point of 
view, concentrating on the German/Prussian military experience.  He was perhaps most 
influential with his definition of “militarism,” which he described as the state of a 
society that “ranks military institutions and ways above the prevailing attitudes of 
civilian life and carries the military mentality into the civilian sphere" (Vagts 1937, 11-
15).  Louis Smith (1951), whose work pre-dated Huntington's, discussed issues of 
congressional and judicial control over the military as well as executive civilian control 
of military matters.  However, all that discussion predated a general recognition that the 
American experience was going to change in the post-World War II era.  Once it became 
apparent that the American military was going to maintain historically high levels of 
active-duty personnel, concerns about the differences between civilian and military 
cultures quickly came to the forefront.  The ensuing debate can be generally divided into 
three periods with different emphases in each. 
 The first period, roughly beginning with the end of World War II and ending in 
about 1973 with the end of the military draft, was primarily concerned with defining 









civilians actually controlled the military.  As discussed above, Huntington and Janowitz 
dominated the debate. 
 The second period started in about 1973, with the end of conscription and the 
establishment of the All-Volunteer Force, and continued until the end of the Cold War.  
This period was concerned with the supposed lessons of the Vietnam War, how the 
volunteer force changed the nature of the armed forces, and whether those changes led 
to wider gaps between military and civilian societies. 
The third period, beginning with the end of the Cold War and continuing today, 
has seen an increasing interest in and concern about the existence of a “civil-military 
culture gap.”  The discussion has centered around three questions: (1) whether such a 
gap exists in the first place, (2) if it does exist, whether its existence matters, and (3) if it 
does matter, what changes in policy might be required to mitigate the negative effects of 
such gap.  Most agree that a gap does exist, but there is widespread disagreement as to 
whether the gap matters.  There has been even less discussion about what policies may 
be required to mitigate any such gap.  However, few have predicted disaster in civil-
military relations and most of the discussion has centered on the nature of the gap and 
what might be causing it.  In this section, the discussion will concentrate on the third 









(1) What is the nature of the gap?  (2) Why does the gap matter?  and (3) How can the 
problem be corrected?2 
 
What Is the Nature of the Gap?   
While the debate surrounding a presumed culture gap between civilian and 
military societies had continued since at least the early 1950s, it became prominent in 
the early 1990s with the conclusion of the Cold War.  The promised “peace dividend” 
led to a debate over changes in American national security strategy and what that would 
mean in terms of the transformation of the mission, composition, and character of the 
armed forces.   
The gap debate revolved around two related concepts: (1) the notion of a cultural 
gap, i.e., the differences in the culture, norms, and values of the military and civilian 
worlds, and (2) the notion of a connectivity gap, i.e., the lack of contact and 
understanding between them (Cohn 1999).  Few argued that there was no difference 
between the two worlds, but some were convinced that the difference itself was the 
primary danger.  Maynes (1998) worried that a military force consisting primarily of 
personnel from the lower socio-economic classes would ultimately refuse to fight for the 
goals of the upper classes.  Tarr and Roman (1998, October 19), on the other hand, were 
concerned that the similarities between military elites and civilian elites enabled a 
                                                 
 
 
2 The organization of this section is based on a descriptive methodology used by Lindsay Cohn (1999) 
who posed four questions: (1) what is the nature of the gap, (2) what has caused the gap, (3) why does the 
gap matter, and (4) how the problems, if any, are to be corrected.  In the present study, Cohn’s first two 









dangerous politicizing trend among the military.  Chivers (1999, September 14) 
represented a small number who believed that the differences between the cultures were 
so small as to be essentially irrelevant. 
 Reasons for the cultural and connectivity gaps vary widely.  The self-selective 
nature of the All-Volunteer Force is seen by some to have led to the unrepresentative 
nature of the armed forces (Eitelberg and Little 1995; Bacevich and Kohn 1997; Maynes 
1998).  One argument, put forward by a Navy Chief of Chaplains, was that the 
drawdown in the size of the military was exacerbating differences and making the 
separation between the military and civilian societies potentially even more divisive.  He 
worried that unless an effective dialogue could be maintained between the military and 
civilian branches of society, especially in the area of ethical decision-making, the 
American military risked losing the support of society or becoming dangerously 
militaristic (Muchow 1995).  Others argued that the increase in diversity among military 
personnel has actually strengthened ties between society and the military, especially 
those ties weakened by the results of the Vietnam War (Tasker 1990; Binkin 1993).  
Most were persuaded that the societal effects of the Vietnam War remained central to 
the cultural differences (Stiehm 1996; Snider and Carlton-Carew 1995; Will 1997, May 
25; Danzig 1999).    
One unique view, which does not neatly fall into either of the cultural- or 
connectivity-gap categories, centers on the organizational differences between the 
military and civilian societies.  This view claims to explain much as to why the military 









beyond the simpler cultural-gap approach and emphasizes the ability of the military 
society to control the behavior and attitudes of its members in ways not possible in the 
more open civilian society, as evidenced by such phenomena as desegregation of the 
military and inclusion of women in the military (Cohn 1999).  
 
Why Does the Gap Matter?   
 
Ultimately, the cultural gap matters only if it endangers civilian control of the 
military or if it reduces the ability of the country to maintain an effective military force.  
Those who concentrate on the nature of the gap tend not to be concerned about 
dangerous trends.  However, those who are concerned about the lack of understanding 
between the civilian and military worlds are uniformly convinced that the civil-military 
relationship in the United States is unhealthy (Maslowski 1990; Bacevich and Kohn 
1997; Chivers 1999; Feaver 1999).  Specifically, they have voiced concerns about a 
military that may become openly contemptuous of civilian norms and values and may 
then feel free to openly question the value of defending such a society (McIsaac and 
Verdugo 1995).  Others worry whether an inexperienced civilian government will 
undermine the military by ineffective or inappropriate policies, thus threatening U.S. 
national security (Eitelberg and Little 1995; Kreisher 1996; Levins 1996; Duncan 1997).   
This debate has generally settled on whether or not the gap is too wide.  If too 
wide, civilian control of the military may be jeopardized due to serious 









expected and, in and of itself, is not dangerous (Sarkesian, et al. 1995; Segal 1995; 
Kreisher 1997; Simons 1997), some do concede the aspects of that gap have led directly 
to misunderstandings between the two worlds.  In particular, some have argued that the 
culture of political conservatism and the apparent increase in partisanship of the officer 
corps has approached a dangerous limit (Kohn 1994; Bacevich 1997).  Nearly all agree 
that it is possible for the cultural gap to be either too wide or too narrow, but there is 
wide disagreement as to where the current situation rests on that continuum.  While Kier 
(1999) argues that “structure and function do not determine culture,” most agree that a 
difference between the two is necessary because civilian culture was “incommensurate 
with military effectiveness” (Cohn 1999). 
Correcting the Problem 
 
Assuming that a problem exists, many have offered suggestions for narrowing 
the gap and correcting the problems arising from it.  In general, those suggestions are 
along three lines.  The first is that the military must reach out to the civilian world.  
Given the essentially universal agreement that civilians must control the military, the 
duty falls upon the military to find ways to talk to civilians, not the other way around 
(Gilroy 1995; Sarkesian et al. 1995; Levins 1996; Willams 1998; Danzig 1999; Shelton 
1998).  The second is that civilians must articulate a clear vision of what they expect in 
terms of the military mission (Duncan 1997, Bacevich and Kohn 1998; Maynes 1998; 
Ricks 1998a, 1999b; Moskos, Williams, and Segal 2000).  And the final suggestion is 









is to be bilateral education, in which both military and civilian elites would jointly attend 
specialized schools.  Such schooling would emphasize military-strategic thinking, 
American history and political philosophy, military ethics, and the proper relationship 
between civil and military authority (Nye 1996; Sarkesian 1998; Shelton 1998; Williams 
1998; Rosenfeld 1999). 
Some argue that the root problem is that the military is self-selecting, rendering 
the culture a self-perpetuating one.  Solutions such as the reinstatement of the draft and a 
European-style national service obligation have been offered (Ricks 1997b; Simons 
1997; Moskos 1999; Rangel 2006a; Philips 2009, March 23), but none appear to have 
made any progress toward adoption. 
WHAT ABOUT ENLISTED PERSONNEL? 
 
Nearly all of the above discussion centered on civilian and military elites, as 
those groups have been the decision-makers with respect to defense and national 
security policy.  Thus, little discussion focused on enlisted personnel, largely because 
little primary research into the political attitudes of enlisted personnel has been 
conducted.  However, a single article in Atlantic Monthly about a group of Marine 
enlisted personnel generated extensive debate as to whether a dangerous divide exists 
between the military and civilian worlds.  Journalist Thomas Ricks (1997a) followed a 
platoon of Marine recruits through basic training in 1995, monitoring the change in their 
attitudes as compared to the societies from which they came.  He cited specific examples 









their boot camp experience and more fit to be citizens of the United States.3  He 
wondered if, because of their more conservative outlook on life, the new Marines 
accurately understood American society. 
In the wake of Ricks’ article, numerous writers used his observations as evidence 
of a growing divide in the United States that portended, at one extreme, a danger to 
national security and, at the other, a pathology that required correction (Feaver and 
Kohn 2001; Rubin and Keaney 2001; Bicksler et al. 2004; English 2004; Feaver 2005; 
Gibson 2008).  The discussion recalled post-Vietnam War arguments that the civilian 
culture had degraded and was perhaps not worthy of defense by the military. 
The debate is not yet resolved.  Aside from the article by Ricks and other 
scattered journalistic and scholarly commentary, the position of the enlisted person 
within the American civil-military debate remains unexamined.  Especially unresolved 
is where that population fits into the culture gap debate.  As previously discussed, most 
writers assume that the opinions of officers are predictive of those held by enlisted 
personnel.  There is reason to question this assumption. 
 One solution offered to correct the apparent gap between military and civilian 
cultures is a return to conscription.  At the heart of the call for conscription is a belief 
that the people filling the enlisted ranks are not descriptively representative of the 
American population and therefore pose an unacceptable risk to American civil-military 
                                                 
 
 
3 Ricks originally wrote the piece while a visiting scholar at the Foreign Policy Institute and Strategic 
Studies Institute at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, in 1996.  
Later that year he revised it while participating in the Project on U.S. Post-Cold War Civil-Military 









relations.  That risk is a growing sense that citizens from the lowest socio-economic 
strata of the American population are fighting the wars of the privileged few.  If a 
principal source of concern about the civil-military gap is about the nature of those in 
the enlisted ranks, then theory that omits those personnel or studies that assume they are 
the same as, or at least similar to, officers, are ignoring an important segment of the 
military population. 
 Before we can undertake the study to determine any attitudinal or behavioral 
differences, we need to know more about the demographics of the modern military and 
in particular those of enlisted personnel.  Chapter 3, following, will provide those details 
and will be the factual basis upon which further analysis will be based.  Then, as this 
study is also interested in voting behavior of enlisted personnel, Chapter 4 will discuss 














In this chapter, the demographics of the modern armed forces are examined with 
a concentration on enlisted personnel.  Given the relationship between voter 
demographics and voter behavior, it is essential that the armed services demographics, 
particularly the characteristics of enlisted personnel, be presented to show how they may 
be different from those of officers or the general American voting population. 
The fundamental questions asked in this study grew out of an observation that 
reported political behavior and attitudes of the American military appeared to be at odds 
with what would be expected given the military’s demographic composition.  This 
chapter will establish the “ground truth” of the present state of American military 
demographics, particularly those of enlisted personnel, using official data from 
Department of Defense (DOD) sources and supported by other data sources. 
The current military enlisted force will be reviewed based on five demographic 
characteristics: racial and ethnic background, gender, household income, educational 
background, and geographic origin.  The data presented here are drawn from recruits, 
i.e., personnel who have just been enlisted in the services, as well as the remainder of the 
active-duty enlisted component.  Recruit data highlights the nature of the individuals 
entering active duty before any socialization effect of the armed forces can take effect.  









entire force, including the effects of socialization and any effects that may cross age 
cohorts. 
RACIAL AND ETHNIC BACKGROUND 
 
Maintaining equitable racial and ethnic representation within the U.S. military 
has been an ongoing concern for recruiters.  While specific racial quotas are not 
assigned to individual recruiters, the military carefully tracks the racial and ethnic 
makeup of its personnel.  The various services' goals are to maintain within the military 
approximately the same proportion of the various races as is present in the U.S. 
population.  The statistics are tracked annually and provided to Congress in Fiscal Year 
End Strength Reports. 
During the Vietnam War, public support for conscription had begun to wane.  
The military services were increasingly concerned that the quality of conscript was less 
than satisfactory, resulting in a series of severe disciplinary incidents.  In 1969, President 
Richard Nixon established the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed 
Force to develop a plan to return to an all-volunteer military.   
The draft law's expiration on June 30, 1973, and the evolution of the subsequent 
All-Volunteer-Force, raised concern as to whether an effective force could be 
maintained by drawing only from volunteers (Kohn, 1974; Davis, 1974; Bachman et.al., 
1977).  Particular attention was paid to whether the “burden of war” might fall 
disproportionately on particular sectors of the population, especially minorities and the 









reinforced worries that the poor and disadvantaged were being burdened with fighting 
the nation’s wars.  In 1973, the proportion of the active-duty force that was black was 
about 14 percent; by 1980 that proportion had increased to nearly 22 percent.   
The increase in such enlistments was credited by a presidential task force on 
military manpower to “the proud heritage of Black service in the military […] which has 
contributed strongly to the prestige of military service in the Black community.”  The 
same task force observed that the military offered “better opportunities for responsible 
work at fair compensation than are available to [blacks] in many segments of the private 
sector.”  By 1982 all services had established affirmative action plans to determine 
whether minorities, particularly blacks, were adequately represented.  Where such was 
not the case, the minorities were “targeted for increased placement efforts" (Hardyman, 
1988). 
 
Recruits.4  Beginning in 2003, The Heritage Foundation conducted a series of analyses 
on the quality of recruits and the active-duty enlisted component.  Drawing on data from 
the U.S. Census Bureau and the Defense Manpower Data Center, the researchers were 
able to point out trends in recruiting not previously known (Kane 2005, 2006; Watkins 
                                                 
 
 
4 In this study, races will be divided into three categories: (1) White, (2) Black, and (3) Other.  Given the 
relatively small numbers of personnel identifying as Asian, Native Hawaiian, American Indian, and 
Native Alaskan races, all have been grouped together as “Other.”  Hispanic data gathered before January 
2003 is generally not comparable to data reported after that date because of different methodologies used 
to gather it.  Because of the resulting discontinuity in data, no attempt is made to show a time series for 









and Sherk 2008).  Those data and reports were made available to this project and 
permission was given to reproduce several tables. 
In 2006, 65.3 percent of all recruits with no prior military service were white.  At 
the same time, whites made up about 62 percent of the U.S. male population aged 18 to 
24, resulting in a “recruit-to-population” ratio of 1.05.5 In the same year, black recruits 
made up 12.34 percent of total recruits but just 11.87 percent of the male population 
aged 18 to 14, a recruit-to-population ratio of 1.04, or about the same as for whites.  
Other races had ratios less than 1.0, meaning they were under-representative of the 
population.  A notable exception among “other” races were American Indian/Aleut 
(Native Alaskan) recruits which had a 2.96 recruit to population ratio.  (See Table 3.1.) 
  
                                                 
 
 
5 It is difficult to decide the appropriate population to use in comparison.  Since 85 percent of recruits are 
male, it makes more sense to compare recruits to the age 18-24 male population rather than to the entire 



































White  61.99%  65.32%  1.05  65.50%  1.06 
Black  11.87%  12.34%  1.04  12.82%  1.08 
Asian/Pacific Islander  3.49%  3.31%  0.95  3.25%  0.93 
Multi‐racial  1.56%  0.57%  0.37  0.66%  0.42 
AmericanIndian/Aleut  0.73%  2.16%  2.96  1.96%  2.68 
 
 
Groups with recruit-to-population ratios greater than 1.0 are over-represented among enlisted 
recruits and groups with ratios less than 1.0 are under-represented. 
* 2007 ratio calculated using the 2006 population estimates 
Used by permission: Heritage Foundation (Watkins & Sherk, 2008) 
 
Using the same technique as with the races listed above, we can see that 
Hispanics are also under-represented among new recruits with recruit-to-population 



































Hispanic  20.02%  13.19%  0.66  12.93%  0.65 
Not Hispanic  79.98%  86.81%  1.09  87.07%  1.09 
 
* 2007 ratio calculated using 2006 population estimates 
Used by permission: Heritage Foundation (Watkins & Sherk, 2008) 
 
Active Enlisted Component.  Just as with the U.S. population, whites are the largest 
single racial group within the U.S. military, comprising about 69 percent of the enlisted 
force.  Despite these figures, since the end of the Vietnam War, whites have been under-
represented when compared to the U.S. age 18-44 population.6  Blacks, however, have 
been over-represented since at least 1975.  As of January 2009, blacks comprised 18.6 
percent of the enlisted force.  The other races within the military, which make up 12.8 
percent of the enlisted force, are under-represented in the military as compared to the 
U.S. population.  The proportion of other races in the enlisted force has been steadily 





                                                 
 
 
6 The U.S. age 18-44 population is used as the appropriate comparison group to the active-duty enlisted 
population.  Most enlisted personnel will have left active service or retired before reaching age 44.  A 













Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2009. 
 
Blacks make up a substantially larger proportion within the military than in the 
U.S. population, especially within the Army.  However, more recently, the number of 
black recruits has been declining.  A sharp decline in black enlistment has been noted 
since September 11, 2001, and especially since the U.S. intervention in Iraq, which has 
led to a decrease in the black proportion of the enlisted force. The black active-duty 
enlisted component since 1973 as compared to civilian blacks aged 18 to 24 is shown in 
Figure 2.6.  Despite the recent decline, the proportion of blacks within the U.S. military 


































































Figure 3.2 Black Active Enlisted Component Compared to Civilians Ages 18 to 24  




Source: OUSD, P&R, Population Representation of the Military Service, 2000,  
Table D-17 and Defense Manpower Data Center,  
Active-duty Accession Enlisted Gains Report, 2008 
GENDER  
 
 Gender is the demographic element within the military most strikingly 
unrepresentative demographic within the military when compared to the American 
population.  The female proportion of active-duty enlisted personnel is about 14 percent, 
while women make up 52 percent of the U.S. population.  However, the percentage of 
women in the military has been increasing steadily since the end of the Vietnam War.  In 
1972 women made up less than two percent of the military population.  By 1986, that 
percentage had increased to 10 percent and reached 15 percent in 2002.  (See Figure 





















































Figure 3.3 Female Enlisted Members as a Percentage of the Total Active-Duty Force  
(1970 - 2007) 
 
Source: OUSD, P&R, Population Representation of the Military Service, 2005, Table D-13 and Defense 
Manpower Data Center, Active-duty Accession Enlisted Gains Report, 2008. 
 
 
Recruiting of women increased dramatically following the Vietnam War, not 
reaching a peak until the turn of the century.  In 1972, women made up less than two 
percent of all recruits.  By 1980 more than 13 percent of recruits were women.  By 2000, 
women comprised more than 18 percent of recruits.  However, the proportion of female 




























































Figure 3.4 Female Enlisted Members as a Percentage of All Recruits  
(1970 – 2007) 
 
 
Source: OUSD, P&R, Population Representation of the Military Service, 2005, Table D-5 and Defense 
Manpower Data Center, Active-duty Accession Enlisted Gains Report, 2008. 
 
 As a subgroup, black women are significantly over-represented in the military.  
Of the 164,343 women on active duty in all services as of January 31, 2009, 51,074 
(31.1 percent) are black while 88,408 (53.8 percent) are white, proportions that are out 
of keeping with general U.S. demographics.  In the Army, the over-representation of 
black women is even more pronounced, with black women representing nearly 39 
percent of female active-duty and white women representing about 49 percent.  Among 
senior enlisted women in the Army, black women outnumber white women by 2.16 to 1, 
indicating that reenlistments among black women are higher than among white women.7 
The same is not true for males in the Army, where white men outnumber black men by a 
ratio of over 2-1. 
                                                 
 
 
7 The senior enlisted pay-grades are E-6 through E-9, generally known as Staff Non-commissioned 
officers (SNCO).  In the Army, there are 7,761 black women in those pay-grades while there are only 













































The DOD does not maintain data on the family income of recruits, nor does it 
collect income data for individuals entering active service.  Since the majority of 
enlistees are entering into their first full-time job, in the absence of data regarding their 
own income it makes most sense to determine the household income of the family from 
which the enlistee came.  As household income is a key component of socioeconomic 
status (SES), it is important to have some measure of it.  As the recruits often have little 
income history of their own, here the income of family of origin – a staple partial 
measure of SES – is used. 
Data approximating each recruit’s family income is estimated by using the 
address of each individual recruit and Census tract data.8 Census tracts are relatively 
small, homogeneous areas that average approximately 4,000 residents.  Individual 
recruits' hometown data, including their addresses and five-digit zip codes, are available 
from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).  Census tract data is available from 
the U.S. Census Bureau.   
The estimates of household income are calculated by applying the mean 
household income for each census tract to each recruit from that tract.  For example, in 
the Heritage Foundation studies using these data, ten military recruits in 2006 came from 
                                                 
 
 
8 Based on data collected from the Defense Manpower Data Center and the Department of Defense, Office 
of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, October 2002 - September 2005, Non-prior 
Duty Active-duty Accessions (http://www.defenselink.mil/prhome/) , and the U.S. Census Bureau 









census tract 013396 in San Diego.  Each of those 10 recruits was assigned the mean 
annual income of $57,380 from that tract as found in the 2000 Census (Watkins & 
Sherk, 2008).  The mean estimated household income for all 2006 recruits was 
calculated as $54,834 per year.  The mean household income for recruits in 2007 was 
$54,768, slightly higher than the national mean household income of $50,428.9  (See 
Figure 3.5 for the distribution of household incomes of recruits and the general 
population by income quintile.)  
The lowest two quintiles, representing mean household incomes under $42,040, 
are under-represented among recruits in both 2006 and 2007.  Individuals in the highest 
two quintiles, representing mean household incomes greater than $51,127, make up 40.0 
percent of the population but produced 49.3 percent of the recruits in both 2006 and 
2007 (Watkins & Sherk, 2008).  The lowest two quintiles produced 28.9 percent of the 
recruits in 2006 and 29 percent in 2007.  Research for 2003, 2004 and 2005 shows 






                                                 
 
 
9 The personal consumption expenditure (PCE) deflator is used and amounts are expressed in 2008 
dollars.  The PCE is an estimate of inflation among major categories of expenditure by consumers and is 

























Used by permission, Heritage Foundation (Watkins & Sherk, 2008) 
 
 
Military enlistees, at least since 2003, disproportionately have come from upper-
middle income families.  Just less than two-thirds of all recruits have come from the 
middle three quintiles of households.  The 20 percent of households with the lowest 




















Poorest  19.79%  14.61% 14.14% 13.66% 10.60%  10.70% 
Next Poorest  20.04%  19.56% 19.24% 19.21% 18.30%  18.30% 
Middle  20.05%  21.15% 21.21% 21.46% 21.70%  21.70% 
Next Richest  20.10%  22.52% 22.70% 22.82% 24.30%  24.40% 











Poorest    ‐5.18% ‐5.65% ‐6.13% ‐9.19%  ‐9.09% 
Next Poorest  ‐0.48% ‐0.80% ‐0.83% ‐1.74%  ‐1.74% 
Middle    1.10% 1.16% 1.41% 1.65%  1.65% 
Next Richest    2.42% 2.60% 2.72% 4.20%  4.30% 
Richest    2.15% 2.70% 2.83% 4.98%  4.88% 
With Differences by Comparison to U.S. ages 18-24 population10 
Table data and format used by permission of the Heritage Foundation. 
 
The mean annual income levels of the households from which recruits are drawn 
have risen slightly for at least the past decade.  Over the same period, the mean income 
of recruit households has been consistently higher than the mean income of the third 
quintile of households, further supporting the proposition that recruits in today’s military 





                                                 
 
 
10 The data shown in the table for U.S. ages 18-24 data for all years are based on U.S. Census Bureau data 









Figure 3.6 Mean Recruit Household Annual Income Compared to National Mean  
Household Annual Income by Quintile, 1999 – 2007 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables, Table H-3,  
Mean Household Income Received by Each Fifth and Top 5 Percent All Races: 1967 to 2007. 
 
 
These findings are supported by a 2007 Congressional Budget Office study 
provided to Rep. John Murtha, the Chairman of the Defense Subcommittee of the House 
Committee on Appropriations, which reported that recruits and enlisted personnel were 
not as likely to belong to the lowest or the highest income groups, but were generally 
distributed among middle-income families (Congressional Budget Office, 2007).  While 
it is generally true that recruitment is easier during downturns in the national economy, 
comments by public officials stating that the majority of enlisted personnel come from 
communities of high unemployment, implying that the recruits have no other options, 
are inaccurate and reflect at best an earlier time in American history.11     
                                                 
 
 
11 Charles Rangel (2006b), in an interview conducted by Chris Wallace on Fox News, stated, “I want to 
make it abundantly clear: if there’s anyone who believes that these youngsters want to fight, as the 
















































The military of today requires recruits that are capable of managing highly 
technical equipment.  Even an Army or Marine Corps rifleman, historically the lowest 
person in the military hierarchy, is not the “cannon fodder” of past wars.  All of today's 
American infantry Soldiers and Marines are the equivalent, or better, of an elite soldier 
of earlier days.  In order to ensure the recruitment of personnel of sufficient quality who 
can adequately handle modern requirements, the military services generally require that 
90 percent of recruits have graduated from high school and that all but a small portion 
have scored above the 50th percentile on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). 
 
Recruits.  The percentage of recruits who have completed at least a high school 
education has dramatically increased over the past three decades.  In 1973, the first year 
of the All-Volunteer Force and the last year of conscription, only 65 percent of non-
prior-service enlistees had completed high school.  Most of the current assumptions 
about the generally low level of educational attainment among enlisted personnel likely 
stem from that period or before.  
The high school graduation rate of recruits remained low throughout the rest of 
the 1970s, although policies were established by the Department of Defense to 
encourage recruiting of individuals with high-school diplomas.  Following the dramatic 
increases in military pay that began in the early years of the Reagan administration, 
recruiting became easier and the high-school completion rate among recruits began to 
increase sharply, reaching 89 percent by 1983 and 94 percent by 1993.  (For the 
                                                                                                                                                
 
 
fight just because of a bonus and just because of educational benefits.  And most all of them come from 
communities of very, very high unemployment.  If a young fella has an option of having a decent career or 









purposes of calculating the high-school graduation rate among recruits, the attainment of 
a GED is not considered by the DOD to be the equivalent of a diploma.) 
Of the branches of the military, the Army has had the greatest difficulty in 
maintaining the goal of 90 percent of all recruits having a high school diploma.  This has 
been especially true in the past few years.  The other services have not had the same 
difficulty, largely owing to lower enlistment goals as well as selective enlistments, i.e., 
potential recruits deciding to enlist in the other services and avoiding the Army.  While 
the overall high-school diploma attainment rate for the Department of Defense for 2005, 
2006, and 2007 has been has been above 90 percent, the Army’s percentages for the 
same periods were 84, 73, and 71 percent, respectively.  Despite the Army’s difficulties, 
since 1981 the high school graduation rate of all DOD enlistees has consistently been 
higher than that of the general age 18-24 population.  (See Figure 3.7.) 
One difficulty in enlisting high-quality individuals into military service has been 
high school graduates’ propensity to enter post-secondary education, most often 
immediately following graduation.  The number of individuals who enlist in military 
service following completion of college has historically been low, suggesting that 
promising recruits are thus permanently diverted from military careers (National Center 
for Education Statistics, 2005).  In 1973, 33 percent of 18 to 19-year-old males were 
enrolled in higher education.  By 2003, this figure stood at 47 percent (National Center 
For Education Statistics, 2004).  In 2003, 61 percent of males and 68 percent of females 

















Figure 3.7 Percentage of Recruits Who Are High School Graduates Compared to Civilians Ages 18 to 24  
1973 – 200712 
  
 
Source: OUSD, P&R, Population Representation of the Military Service, 2005, Table D-7 and Defense 
Manpower Data Center, Active-duty Accession Enlisted Gains Report, 2008 
 
Given the rank structure of the military, most enlisted recruits do not have 
college degrees.  However, in fiscal year 2006 2.7 percent of all recruits had completed 
some college courses and another 4.2 percent had already completed an Associate’s 
Degree or better.13  Those percentages were similar for fiscal year 2007. 
Overall, more than 98 percent of enlisted recruits have a high school diploma or 
GED equivalent.  In fiscal year 2005, only 1.2 percent of recruits had not graduated from 
high school or completed a GED equivalent, as compared to between 21 and 25 percent 
                                                 
 
 
12 Data for the U.S. population ages 18 to 24 without high school diplomas are not available for years 
prior to 1977. 
13 The U.S. Government defines its fiscal year as beginning on October 1.  Thus, fiscal year 2007 began 




















of Americans ages 18 to 24 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005).14 By fiscal year 2007, 1.4 
percent of recruits had not attained a high school equivalent education as compared to 
20.8 percent of the U.S. 18-24-year-old population (Watkins & Sherk, 2008).  Within 
the Department of Defense, the Army enlists a majority (59 percent) of the non-high-
school graduate recruits, but even that makes up only 1.5 percent of all Army recruits.  
 The educational attainment of recruits has been consistently higher than the 
average attainment of the age 18-24 group in nearly every census tract, at least since 
1999 (Kane, 2005, 2006).  Following September 11, 2001, the gap between recruits and 
the age 18-24 population increased for about two years, indicating that the quality of 
recruits was increasing during that period.  That trend of increased educational 
attainment by recruits reversed slightly after a peak in 2003, but still remains above the 
pre-September 11, 2001, levels.  After the 1992 peak of 97.74 percent high achievement 
among recruits, a slight downward trend can be observed.  (See Figure 3.8.)  In general, 
however, the military continues to draw recruits who are above the average educational 











                                                 
 
 
14 While the U.S. Census Bureau 2000 Census reported that 25 percent of Americans ages 18 to 24 had 
not graduated from high school (or equivalent), the Current Population Survey reported that 21 percent of 














Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Active-duty Accession Enlisted Gains Report, 2008 
 
Active-Duty Component.  Active-duty personnel often take advantage of service-
provided opportunities to advance their education.  Service personnel are able to offset 
the cost of education by filing for tuition assistance, which pays for about 75 percent of 
the cost of classes.  The military and colleges and universities arrange for night classes 
on many bases and ships.  Online degrees are also popular with many service personnel 
because of the flexibility of course offerings and scheduling.  For example, the North 
Carolina Community College system offers online programs to military personnel and 
their families at all of their campuses and also provides extension services on various 
military bases in North Carolina.  San Diego Community College claims to provide 
educational services to over 50,000 military personnel at bases throughout the United 
States (Carroll, 2008). 
While fewer than five percent of recruits have education beyond high school, 
most enlisted personnel without a high school diploma go on to obtain their GED and 





















percentage of recruits who enlist with less than a high school education hovers just 
below 1.5 percent, fewer than one half of one percent of all enlisted personnel on active 
duty have not achieved at least a GED, indicating a continued interest in education 
beyond enlistment.  All the military services provide means by which enlisted personnel 
can complete a GED while on active duty.  In 2007, 11.3 percent of enlisted personnel 




 Knowing the region of origin for military personnel resolves two questions.  
First, it becomes apparent whether any one part of the country is providing more than its 
proportional share of the military force.  Second, and more importantly for this study, 
such knowledge will provide information as to what proportion of military personnel are 
eligible to vote in any given state or region.  The data necessary to resolve those two 
issues are available from the Department of Defense in two separate databases.  For the 
first issue, data on hometowns of recruits will provide the answer.  For the second, we 
can determine where each active-duty military member can vote by finding his or her 
legal place of residence.  
Military personnel are required to maintain a current home of record (HOR) on 
file with their respective services.  This HOR is their legal permanent residence.  It is 
normally the location from which the service-person entered active duty and is where 
                                                 
 
 
15 The Department of Defense defines college experience as attendance, full- or part-time, in any 2- or 4-
year college or university in a class for which credit may be applied toward a degree.  Thus, the usual 









the individual service-person is permitted to register to vote.  For example, a soldier 
stationed and maintaining a residence in Fort Bliss, Texas, but whose home of record is 
in Albany, New York, must register to vote in New York as that state is his legal 
residence.     
A service-member deciding to establish a legal residence in a given state for the 
purpose of voting is required by regulation to change the home of record to match.  
Other local laws with respect to legal residence and voting registration may apply as 
well.  However, even though service-members are required to change their home of 
record, they do not always comply, and errors do exist within the DOD database.  
Despite such shortcomings, the DOD database provides the best information available. 
Though the data is organized by state, it is useful to group states into regions to 
obtain a clearer understanding as to which parts of the United States tend to support the 
military with recruits and enlisted members.  For this study, the United States is divided 
into four regions and nine divisions based on the U.S. Census Bureau practice –   (1) 
Northeast, (2) Midwest, (3) South, and (4) West.  Each is further subdivided into either 
two or three districts.  Territories such as American Samoa, Puerto Rico, and Guam are 
not included in this study, as voters in those areas are not presently permitted to vote for 
President of the United States.  (See Table 3.4 for U.S. regions and districts and which 









Table 3.4 U.S. Regions and Districts 
Region Division States16 
Northeast New England Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, Rhode Island 
Mid Atlantic New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania 
South East South Central Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama 
South Atlantic Maryland, West Virginia, Delaware, District of 
Columbia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, Florida 
West South Central Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana 
Midwest East North Central Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio 
West North Central North Dakota, Minnesota, South Dakota, Iowa, 
Nebraska, Kansas, Missouri 
West Mountain West Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, 
Arizona, New Mexico 
Pacific West Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, Oregon, California 
 




Recruits.  In order to determine regional comparisons in military recruiting, it is helpful 
to find the recruit-to-population (RTP) ratio.  This is calculated by comparing the 
region’s or district’s percentage of total recruits to the same region’s or district’s 
percentage of the total U.S. 18-to-24-year-old male population.  For the present study, 
recruiting statistics for 2007 were obtained from Defense Manpower Data Center and 
compared to the 18-to-24-year-old male population for the same period as compiled by 
the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) from the Minnesota Population 
Center, University of Minnesota (Watkins & Sherk, 2008; Ruggles, et al., 2008).  The 
resultant recruit-to-population (RTP) ratios for the various regions and districts are then 
                                                 
 
 
16 As citizens of the District of Columbia are permitted to vote for President, Washington, D.C., will be 









compared to show the proportion of total recruits coming from each part of the United 
States. 
The South is over-represented among military recruits with an RTP ratio of 1.19.  
The Northeast is under-represented, with an RTP ratio of 0.73.  Wide variation exists 
among individual states, however.  Montana, with only 0.3 percent of the U.S. age 18-24 
male population, provides 0.5 percent of the total recruits for an RTP ratio of 1.67.  
Others at the higher end of the scale include Nevada (1.50), Oregon (1.39), and Maine 
(1.35).  Washington, D.C., has the lowest RTP ratio of 0.25, providing only 0.05 percent 
of all recruits from about 0.3 percent of the 18-to-24-year-old male population.  Other 
states at the lower end of the scale include North Dakota (0.53), Utah (0.56), Rhode 
Island (.058), and Massachusetts (0.60).  See Table 3.5. 
The West South Central district has an RTP ratio of 1.26, the highest of any 
district in the United States.  Three of the four states in that district (Arkansas, 
Oklahoma, and Texas) are ranked in the top ten of states by RTP ratio.  Texas alone, 
with 8.3 percent of the age 18-24 male population, produced nearly 11 percent of all 
military recruits in 2007 followed by California with just over 10 percent.  California, 
with about 13 percent of the age 18-24 male population, had an RTP ratio of 0.80.  Of 
the 50 states and the District of Columbia, 29 states, representing about 51.9 percent of 












Table 3.5 Military Enlisted Recruit-to-Population Ratios by Region/District, 2007 
Region/Division Percent Total  
2007 Recruits 
Percent Total  
18-24 y/o U.S. Males 
Recruit/Population 
Ratio 
Northeast 12.81 17.58 0.73 
Mid Atlantic 9.51 13.10 0.73 
New England 3.30 4.50 0.73 
 
Midwest 21.56 22.02 0.98 
East North Central 14.76 15.10 0.98 
West North Central 6.80 6.90 0.99 
 
South 42.97 36.23 1.19 
East South Central 6.28 5.70 1.10 
South Atlantic 21.62 18.50 1.17 
West South Central 15.07 12.00 1.26 
 
West 22.66 24.17 0.94 
Mountain 7.70 7.20 1.07 
Pacific 14.96 17.00 0.88 
Source: Heritage Center for Data Analysis (Watkins & Sherk, 2008) 
 
 
























Data calculated from DMDC data and IPUMS (Ruggles, et.al., 2008)  











Active Enlisted Component.  As with recruits, the proportion of active-duty enlisted 
personnel varies by state and region within the United States.  DOD statistics record the 
home of record for each member, permitting a tabulation of active-duty personnel by 
state.  Comparing that tabulation to the voter eligible population (VEP) in each state 
results in the military percentage of the voter eligible population. 
The voter eligible population is a subset of the voter age population (VAP).  The 
VAP is calculated by simply tallying all citizens who are of voting age.  VEP is a subset 
of VAP that excludes those individuals who are incarcerated, convicted felons, and 
others not permitted to vote by law.  For the purposes of this study, the VEPs calculated 
by the United States Elections Project at George Mason University are used (McDonald, 
2008).  States are grouped into regions and districts in the same manner as for recruits 
above. 
As with recruits, the South has the highest military percentage of the voter 
eligible population (0.58 percent.)17  The Northeast has the lowest percentage with only 
0.41 percent of its VEP being active-duty military.  The national military percentage of 
the VEP, meanwhile, stands at 0.48 percent.18 Among the South's districts, the West 
South Central district (Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas) has the highest 
percentage of all districts, with 0.64 percent. In the Northeast region, the Mid Atlantic 
                                                 
 
 
17 All numbers are understated by an unknown amount.  The United States Air Force did not provide data 
as to home of record for its 390,253 personnel.  No attempt was made to include the Air Force numbers in 
the regional or district numbers.  
18 Again, U.S. Air Force numbers are not included.  If those numbers are included, the national military 









district (New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania) has the lowest military VEP 
percentage, at 0.39 percent.   
As for the individual states, Montana and Wyoming have the highest military 
percentage of the VEP at 0.74 percent followed by Texas (0.68 percent), Alaska (0.67 
percent), South Carolina (0.66 percent), and Virginia (0.63 percent).  The states with the 
lowest percentages are Massachusetts (0.26 percent), Connecticut (0.29 percent), and 
Minnesota (0.29 percent).  (See Appendix C for a listing of the active-duty military 
population as a percentage of the voting eligible population by state.) 
Thus, with respect to the questions posed about the regional origin of enlisted 
personnel.  The South, and particularly the Southwest, provides more than the average 
proportion of enlistees, and the Northeast is especially under-represented.  The same is 




















Northeast  174,239 42,911,339  0.41% 
Mid Atlantic  109,883 27,869,757  0.39% 
New England  64,356 15,041,582  0.43% 
 
Midwest  190,895 47,168,371  0.40% 
East North Central  131,350 33,016,448  0.40% 
West North Central  59,545 14,151,923  0.42% 
 
South  415,428 72,116,665  0.58% 
East South Central  63,004 12,721,905  0.50% 
South Atlantic  214,462 37,830,641  0.57% 
West South Central  137,962 21,564,119  0.64% 
 
West  216,785 42,221,707  0.51% 
Mountain  68,674 13,006,392  0.53% 
Pacific  148,111 29,215,315  0.51% 
 
U.S.  1,387,600 204,418,082  0.48% 
 
Source: Home of Record Totals, DMDC, 2008.   
Voter Eligible Population, United States Elections Project 
George Mason University, 2008. 
SUMMARY 
 
Some observers insist that the military of today is largely made up of the poor 
and disadvantaged who have no alternative but to enter military service.  Examples 
include writers for the Washington Post (Tyson, 2005), the Los Angeles Times 
(Bowman, 2006), and the New York Daily News (Gonzalez, 2005).  Others argue that the 
military has been forced to accept unqualified recruits in order to meet its recruiting 









a return to conscription for several years, largely based on an assumption that the 
military is a “mercenary force” and “is dominated by men and women who need an 
economic leg-up" (Rangel, 2006a).  
Contrary to the above-mentioned assertions, today's active-duty military is not 
principally a body of economically-disadvantaged people, as it may have been thirty 
years ago.  Many reported stereotypes of military personnel are apparently based on 
outdated information.  While it was true, as recently as the 1960s and 1970s, that the 
average enlisted person came from a poor socioeconomic background, was 
undereducated, was more likely to be unable to get a job in the civilian market, or chose 
to enter the military to avoid incarceration, it is not true today.   
The active-duty enlisted force of today is drawn largely from middle-income 
families, is more highly educated than the equivalent general population, and is more 
likely to come from a rural, rather than an urban, household. Since September 11, 2001, 
recruits are more likely to have come from families with higher incomes than was the 
case before that date.  Similarly, recruits from the lowest two quintiles of household 












Chapter 4: Voting and the American Military 
 
Underlying this research project, and at issue in it, are long-held assumptions 
about the voting behavior of the American military.  The interest in how military 
personnel vote, however, is not matched with reliable data.  To establish what is known 
at present, this chapter will review the history of American military voting behavior and 
issues related to absentee voting.  The chapter will begin by looking at the role the 
American Civil War played in the development of absentee voting for military 
personnel.  Then follows, to the extent to which information is available, a more general 
examination into the identification of military personnel with political parties and their 
participation in electoral matters during the century between the Civil War and the 
Vietnam War.  The chapter will conclude with an examination of legislation regarding 
military and overseas voting, with particular emphasis on two specific issues related to 
military voting: (1) the Federal Voter Assistance Program (FVAP) and how it has 
affected military voter turnout, and (2) military absentee balloting. 
 
THE CIVIL WAR AND THE SOLDIER VOTE 
 
An historical review of American military voting cannot go far without 
mentioning the impact of the Civil War.  For the first time since the end of the American 
Revolution, a national election was carried out while large numbers of soldiers and 









Army consisted of only 16,367 officers and men.  The Navy listed just 9,057 officers 
and men on its rolls.  By July 1, 1862, the Union Army had grown to 186,751 men and 
by the end of that year its numbers had reached more than half a million (527,204).  By 
the time of the November 1864 general election, the Union Army consisted of 
approximately one million men in uniform, most of whom were stationed outside their 
home state.  In the last year of the war, the Navy had about 59,000 personnel, nearly all 
of whom were assigned to ships at sea (Soley, 1887; Davis, 1973; Starr, 1989; Geary, 
1991; Hagan, 1991).  
The election of 1862 was the first electoral contest in the history of the United 
States to raise widespread questions about the voting rights of soldiers and sailors.  
Before then, with a small regular Army and an even smaller Navy, few local government 
officials were concerned about absentee voting issues, it being expected that all citizens 
would simply vote in their local precincts.  Many state constitutions restricted voting to 
locations within state boundaries.  Such limitations effectively made voting by soldiers 
assigned to locations away from their home state illegal.  Some state constitutions 
permitted voting from locations away from the home precinct if the voter was away on 
official state or federal business.  Soldiers, however, were generally excluded from that 
provision (Benton, 1914; Winther, 1944). 
By the election of 1864, steps had been taken by most states to ensure that their 
soldiers in the field could vote.  Some states permitted soldiers to vote by proxy, with 
vote choices sent home to an individual who would cast votes on the soldier’s behalf.  









so far as to send election commissioners to their state regiments in the field to monitor 
the proceedings.   
Support for such measures was not uniform, however, with Democrats generally 
in opposition on the assumption that soldiers would vote for the Republican Party 
candidates.  The Illinois state legislature, controlled by Democrats, refused to pass a law 
permitting soldiers to vote by absentee ballot.  Indiana refused to permit any soldier to 
vote.  In September 1864, Abraham Lincoln wrote to General William T. Sherman, who 
was at that time in Atlanta, Georgia, encouraging him to permit Indiana's soldiers to 
return home to vote in the state elections (Lincoln, 1894).  This pattern of partisan 
support for military absentee balloting, based on expectations of which political party 
such measures would support, would be repeated in the future.   
Despite provisions by most states, efforts by the Democratic Party ensured 
widespread disenfranchisement of Union soldiers.  Only about 150,000 of the army's 
more than 1 million soldiers were able to cast absentee ballots from the field in the 1864 
general election.  However, many soldiers were able to return to their home states to 
vote in that election and thus did not submit absentee ballots.  No record was kept of the 
number of soldiers who voted in their home states.  Of those soldiers who were able to 
cast an absentee ballot, 119,754 (or 78 percent) voted for Abraham Lincoln, while only 
34,291 (22 percent) voted for McClellan, the Democratic Party candidate (Zornow, 










PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
 
Information about the party identification of military personnel during the 
century following the American Civil War is fragmentary.  However, there are clues to 
be found by examining veterans’ organizations and the legislative actions taken by the 
Republican and Democratic Parties with respect to military voting, and by exploring the 
assumptions made about which party would most benefit from encouraging the military 
vote. 
Shortly after the Civil War, in 1866, a group of northern veterans formed the 
Grand Army of the Republic (GAR).  The first modern veterans’ organization, it 
essentially functioned as part of the Republican Party by supporting the campaigns of 
former Union soldiers running for political office.  Following a decline in membership 
which began after 1872 and reached a low of about 26,000 in 1876, the GAR shifted its 
emphasis to supporting appropriate pensions for veterans and widows of veterans. By 
1890, membership had surged to 409,489 and the GAR's influence and support of the 
Republican Party remained as strong as ever.  The group claimed it had saved the 
Republic and condemned the Democratic Party as Copperheads, traitors who had been 
against the war and who would have permitted the southern states to secede from the 
Union (Dearing, 1952; McConnell, 1992). 
While veterans of the American Civil War, as represented by the Grand Army of 
the Republic, were strongly Republican, the party identification of active-duty military 
personnel during the late nineteenth century is not as clear.  Officers maintained close 









mostly geared to acquire rank or obtain positions within the small Army of the post-war 
years.  There is little evidence to suggest that officers publicly expressed any particular 
party identification, but since most were Civil War veterans, they were likely to be 
sympathetic to the Republican Party.  There is evidence, however, to suggest that 
enlisted personnel were largely apolitical, not participating in any partisan activity and 
likely not voting. 
A large percentage of active-duty enlisted personnel during the late 19th century 
were recent immigrants, comprising as much as a quarter of the Army and even more in 
the Navy (Gould, 1869; White, 1972, 1974; Harrod, 1978; Valle, 1980; Kohn, 1981).  
While immigrants were often permitted (and even recruited) to vote in the large cities 
and tended to identify with the Democratic Party, soldiers had little access to the 
electoral process because they were assigned to remote posts in the American West, 
fighting in the Indian wars (Rickey, 1999; Campbell, 2005).  Most enlisted personnel 
during the later 19th century were undereducated, came from economically deprived 
backgrounds, had criminal records, or were running from the law.  With soldiers 
generally considered to be social outcasts, there was little public or political interest in 
supporting measures to enable soldiers to vote.  An October 1866 editorial in The Nation 
argued that soldiers were not worthy of the right to vote and should not be granted 
suffrage as they rarely had opportunities to read or to educate themselves on electoral 
matters and argued further that allowing them to vote would open up new avenues for 
election fraud.  Most worrisome to the editorialist was that the soldier harbored a “spirit 









(Ought Soldiers To Vote?, 1866, October 25).  The combination of these factors ensured 
that the enlisted man in the decades following the Civil War had little opportunity to 
participate in elections, regardless of his desires in the matter (Utley, 1973, personal 
interview April 8, 2008). 
Since the end of the Civil War, American military personnel had generally been 
apolitical, not only in terms of public support for one political party or another but also 
in terms of whether they voted at all.  The Spanish-American War did not involve long-
term or large-scale military deployments and the brief 18-month involvement of U.S. 
troops in World War I encompassed only the 1918 mid-term elections and thus did not 
involve a presidential vote.   
Between the Civil War and the years following World War I, the nature of the 
American military had not changed significantly.  Despite short-term increases in size 
during the Spanish-American War and World War I, by the 1920s the Army and the 
Navy were once again relatively small organizations, with most soldiers and sailors 
assigned to remote outposts or kept on board ships, largely isolated from society and 
uninvolved in political activity.  The apolitical nature of the military continued through 
the 1930s, with usually less than 30 percent of the officers voting, indicating their lack 
of involvement in partisan politics as well.  General George C. Marshall, U.S. Army 
Chief of Staff from 1939 until 1945, even openly questioned whether it was ethical for a 
military officer to vote for a presidential candidate (Pogue, 1963; Clifford, 1991), and 
General Dwight Eisenhower apparently never voted until after he left active duty, 









2002). There is no data on enlisted voting during that period, but is assumed to have 
been at even lower rates than for officers.   
The rate of voting by soldiers declined further during the war years of 1942 to 
1945 and remained low until the early 1950s, when participation began gradually to 
increase.  The officer voting turnout, however, had reached only 40 percent by 1956 and 
the enlisted turnout rate was probably even lower (Van Riper & Unwalla, 1965; Alvarez 
et. al., 2007).  Military personnel likely did not vote for a reason long common to the 
armed forces: soldiers and sailors were often stationed at remote bases or overseas with 
limited access to mail.  The stationing of individuals away from home and out of 
communication resulted in their paying less attention to electoral matters at home and 
made access to voting procedures problematic at best. 
THE FEDERAL VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND MILITARY VOTER TURNOUT  
 
The apolitical nature of armed forces personnel meant that interest in assuring 
the military could vote remained low to non-existent for quite some time.  The ability of 
the soldier or sailor to vote remained in the hands of the individual states.  Although 
most states had enacted laws permitting military personnel to vote during World War I, 
the varying state laws made it difficult for military personnel to cast a vote.  By 1940, 
most states required registration to vote, but in 18 of them, registration had to be in 
person and soldiers were subject to that rule.  Adding to the barriers to voters, most 
southern states also had a poll tax, with only Mississippi and South Carolina exempting 









absentee voting, and of those that did permit the practice, some specifically prevented 
soldiers and sailors from taking advantage of the provision.  Other restrictions that made 
it difficult for military personnel to vote included the requirement to obtain affidavits 
sworn before an officer or to obtain a proxy.  Further complicating the matter for 
deployed troops were the varying deadlines for filing absentee ballots. 
In 1941, the beginning of direct American involvement in World War II, no 
coordination of access to voting for military personnel existed at the federal level.  The 
War Department required that “everything possible” be done “to enable the personnel of 
the Army to exercise their right to vote” but did little more than direct soldiers to “write 
to the Secretary of State of their home state requesting information under the laws of 
that state."  Even President Franklin D. Roosevelt expressed his doubts: “I am not at all 
certain that much can be done about it,” he said.  He suggested that the Army and Navy 
“remind the boys by posting notices…summarizing the laws in each state" (Anderson, 
2001).  Apparently, few soldiers were able to negotiate the complex steps required to 
cast a vote and in November 1942, the first mid-term election conducted during World 
War II, only one-half of one percent of the five million active-duty service personnel 
voted (Leviero, 1955).   
The first attempt by the national level of government to increase military voter 
turnout came in July 1942, when Rep. Robert L. Ramsay (D-WV) introduced a national 
military voting rights bill, which called for special elections on military bases to be 
supervised by the Secretary of State in each state in which the base was located.  The 









it was introduced.  Major changes were made to the bill and provisions were ultimately 
made for the Army and Navy to provide postcards for each military voter to send to their 
individual Secretaries of State.  The state secretaries, upon receipt of the card, were 
required to send the soldier a ballot with the names of those running for federal offices.  
Included was an oath, to be sworn in front of an officer, that the applicant was a 
qualified voter under the laws of the particular state. 
The bill was opposed largely by southern members of Congress because it was 
said to violate states' rights and it included a provision to eliminate poll taxes.  One 
southern Congressman argued that voting was not a matter of right, but rather a privilege 
solely within the purview of the state (Anderson, 2001).  Despite significant differences 
within the Democratic party, largely splitting along regional lines with the southern 
members of Congress voting against it, the Soldier Voting Act of 1942 (P.L.712-561) 
passed both houses of Congress on September 16, 1942, and was signed into law by 
President Roosevelt.  
As the 1944 general election approached, some Democratic Party leaders saw an 
opportunity to benefit from the military vote and pressed for more aggressive military 
voter legislation.  Simultaneously, Republican leaders believed that a reduced military 
vote would bring advantage to their party and, in a move opposite of that taken by the 
party in the Civil War, opposed changes to the Soldier Voting Act.  The Democratic 
Party was able to overcome Republican resistance and amendments to the 1942 law 
were passed and became law on April 1, 1944.  The amendments consisted largely of 









were provided with an opportunity to vote.  There was little in the form of substantive 
requirements, but it did include a provision for a limited federal ballot (APSA, 1952; 
Anderson, 2001).   
Of about 9.2 million voting-age personnel on active duty in 1944, 4.4 million 
requested ballots for the 1944 general election and about 2.6 million returned them, a 
29.1 percent voting turnout rate based on the then-minimum voting age of 21.  In the 
same year, the turnout rate among eligible civilians was about 60 percent.  The military 
absentee vote comprised about 5.6 percent of the total popular vote for president.  No 
data exists on the voting patterns of military personnel who happened to be in the United 
States and in their home precincts (APSA, 1952). 
While no data was collected by the government regarding military voting in the 
1946, 1948, or 1950 elections, it was generally assumed that military voter turnout had 
decreased after the 1944 election.  In 1951, President Truman asked the American 
Political Science Association to convene a special committee to examine service voting 
and make recommendations for legislative and administrative action.  The report, 
published in 1952, resulted in passage of the Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955 
(P.L. 84-296), which provided for voting support not only for overseas-based military 
personnel but for overseas-stationed civilian government employees as well. 
This law also required the President to designate the head of an executive 
department as the coordinator of federal functions described in the law.  President 
Eisenhower designated the Secretary of Defense, who subsequently delegated authority 









Voting Assistance Program (FVAP).  The Director of the FVAP was responsible for 
ensuring that all overseas citizens, whether they are military personnel or employees of 
the federal government, are provided with the necessary information to be able to vote in 
all elections. 
In 1975, drawing on 20 years of experience, including the Vietnam War, 
Congress passed the Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act (P.L.94-203) which repealed 
and updated the 1955 law to clarify reporting requirements and procedures.  It also 
guaranteed absentee registration and voting rights for citizens outside the United States 
regardless of whether they maintained a U.S. residence or address. Since then, the 
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA) (P.L. 99-
410) has further updated the earlier acts of Congress and ensured certain rights for 
overseas citizens as well as military and other government personnel assigned overseas, 
including the unrestrained ability to vote.  It specifically directed states to provide 
overseas personnel with the ability to vote in all elections, including general, primary, 
special, and runoff elections.  Within the 1986 act was a renewed requirement that the 
President report to Congress on the effectiveness of the program following each 
election. 
Military voter turnout did not immediately change following the FVAP’s 
inception in 1955.  However, as the 1976 law was passed, with renewed interest on the 
part of Congress, which required reports by the Secretary of Defense on the 
effectiveness of the program, voting participation by military personnel has increased 









some 15 percent lower than the civilian turnout rate, but by 1984 the voting turnout rate 
by military personnel reached 55 percent which, for the first time, exceeded the national 
voter turnout rate.  By 1992, the military voter turnout rate was 67 percent.  A decline in 
military turnout was noted in the 1996 election (64 percent), but the U.S. turnout rate 
also dropped significantly that year, to 49 percent from 55 percent in the 1992 election.  
(See Figure 4.1.)  
 
Figure 4.1 Military Voter Turnout in General Elections, 1976 – 2004 
Compared to U.S. Voter Age Population Turnout 
 
Source: Military turnout - Federal Voting Assistance Program, 2009 
U.S. turnout - United States Elections Project, George Mason University19 
 
The required report to Congress following the 2000 general election showed that 
69 percent of all military personnel cast ballots, as compared to 54.2 percent of voting-
eligible civilian population.  In 2004, the military percentage increased to 79 percent, 
with 72 percent of overseas personnel and 76 percent of those within the continental 
                                                 
 
 
19 Voter Age Population (VAP) obtained from United States Election Project, George Mason University. 
Data retrieved 12 January 2009 from http://elections.gmu.edu/index.html.  Military voter turnout rates 
were obtained by personal correspondence from the Federal Voting Assistance Program, Department of 





















United States voting, while the turnout rate among civilians that year was 60.1 percent. 
Slight increases in both the military and civilian voter turnout are expected in the 2008 
general election, and the gap between military and civilian voter turnout rates will 
probably continue to increase somewhat.  (See Table 4.1.)20   
 
Table 4.1 Military Voter Turnout, 2000 and 2004 (%)  
Compared to the Voter Eligible Population 21 
Election Year 2000 2004 
Military Turnout 69 79 
VEP Turnout 54.2 60.1 
Mil-VEP Gap 14.8 18.9 
 
ABSENTEE BALLOTING  
 
A large body of literature exists describing the changes in absentee voting laws, 
beginning with the flurry of activity during and immediately after World War I on the 
part of individual states to grant their soldiers an absentee voting capability.  The 
subsequent writing on the subject was descriptive in nature, generally concentrating on 
the general processes within each state and on legal and constitutional issues, with little 
directly relating to military access to absentee balloting (Ray, 1914, 1918a, 1918b, 1919, 
                                                 
 
 
20 Federal Voting Assistance Program, Seventeenth Report, October 2005.  The data for the FVAP reports 
to Congress are generated by a survey conducted by the RAND Corporation.  Voter turnout is self-
reported and so may be inflated to some extent; however, even taking into account such over-reporting, it 
is apparent that the military as a whole votes at a significantly higher rate than does the general 
population, even in mid-term elections. 
21 Voter Eligible Population (VEP) obtained from United States Election Project, George Mason 
University. Data retrieved 12 January 2009 from http://elections.gmu.edu/index.html.  Military voter 









1926; Steinbicker 1938). The experience of granting absentee voting rights to soldiers 
during World War II resulted in some additional comment about procedure and 
discussion of the congressional partisan infighting that occurred in producing the 1942 
bill and the 1944 amendment (Winther, 1944; Martin, 1945).  As mentioned above, the 
American Political Science Association produced a report in 1952, at the request of 
President Truman, describing the process and for the first time in detail presented some 
of the barriers preventing soldiers and sailors from actually being able to execute a vote 
by absentee ballot (APSA, 1952; Keyssar, 2000). 
More recently, research has concentrated on methods to increase absentee voting, 
primarily by reducing the administrative and practical operational barriers to voting, but 
the unique problems in accessing the overseas military community have not been 
discussed in detail (Dubin & Kalsow 1996a, 1996b; Oliver 1996; Patterson & Caldeira 
1985). 
Following the 2000 general election and the attention generated by the handling 
of absentee ballots in Florida, the specific problems with balloting by military personnel 
came into the spotlight and prompted detailed recommendations and analysis of 
alternative methods of casting votes, including various electronic methods (Alvarez et. 
al 2007, 2008; Hall 2008).  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) launched its 
own investigation, and in a statement before a congressional subcommittee on military 
and overseas citizens’ absentee voting, David M. Walker, the Comptroller General of 
the United States, reported that multiple difficulties were posed to absentee balloting by 









requirements (GAO 2001, May; Hall 2008).  In response to some of the GAO's 
observations and recommendations, the FVAP developed an electronic registration and 
voting experiment in time for the 2004 election, but the system was not used due to 
concerns raised about the system’s security (GAO 2006, September). 
Some have argued that military personnel have not and do not face difficulties in 
voting (Mazur 2007).  However, studies conducted since the 2000 general election show 
that both civilians and military personnel living overseas have a more difficult time 
casting absentee ballots than those casting absentee ballots in the United States.  Citizens 
living overseas report having difficulty in registering to vote and in meeting deadlines.  
Furthermore, evidence from studies on absentee balloting in California shows that 
overseas ballots were twice as likely not to be returned and three times more likely to be 
challenged as compared to non-overseas absentee ballots.  For example, about half of 
the UOCAVA absentee ballots sent to overseas personnel were not returned.  Of those 
cast, just fewer than 10 percent were challenged and not counted, principally because 
they arrived after the deadline (Cain et. al 2008; Alvarez et. al 2005, 2007).  However, 
there appears to be little partisan connection with respect to the UOCAVA voters who 
fail to return their ballots or which ballots are ultimately counted (Alvarez et. al 2005). 
The numerous problems posed to overseas voters by the myriad state laws and 
restrictions have not gone unaddressed by the federal government.  The U.S. Department 
of Justice (DOJ) has enforced UOCAVA by bringing suits against various states in 
federal court.  In 2006 alone, lawsuits were filed against Alabama (United States v State 









Carolina (United States v. State of North Carolina, 2006) based on complaints about 
how each handled election deadlines, transmitted ballots to overseas voters, and 
established deadlines for receiving absentee ballots (DOJ 2006, June 8).   
In the Alabama case, the United States filed a Notice of Dismissal once Alabama 
enacted legislation to extend the time between primary and run-off elections to 6 weeks, 
and allowed UOCAVA voters' ballots to be received and counted until noon on the 
seventh day after the run-off election.  In the Connecticut case, a stipulated agreement 
between the DOJ and the state resolved the issue by permitting the use of the Federal 
Write-in Absentee Ballot by UOCAVA voters and allowed extra time for the receipt and 
counting of ballots.  The agreement also required the Secretary of the State of 
Connecticut to work with the DOJ to develop procedures to ensure compliance with 
UOCAVA in future elections for federal office.  In the North Carolina Case, the DOJ 
and the state initially entered into a consent decree in time for the May 2006 primary 
elections.  The two parties eventually agreed to a dismissal of the consent decree after 
North Carolina enacted legislation to provide permanent relief for future elections by 
expanding the time between primary and run-off elections from four to seven weeks and 
extended voters' opportunity to send and receive absentee ballots via facsimile to all 
categories of voters protected by UOCAVA (DOJ 2008, July 25).  Despite these 
agreements between the federal and state governments, problems for overseas voters 










Voting participation by American military personnel has been minimal for most 
of the history of the United States.  The primary reason is wide variances in state laws 
that present legal and practical barriers to remotely stationed military personnel and 
serve to restrict access to a ballot.  Coordinated action on the part of the federal 
government to reduce those barriers began during World War II but only became 
effective with the enactment of the Uniformed Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 
1986.  The passage of legislation previously enacted by Congress during wartime years 
exhibited strong partisan differences, apparently based on views about which political 
party the law would benefit electorally.  It was only when legislation was considered 
during peacetime years, as with the Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955, that 
legislators acted in a more non-partisan manner.  Other than during the Civil War, there 
is little evidence to indicate that the American military’s preference for one political 
party or another was any different from that of the general population.   
The primary result of federal absentee voting legislation and enforcement action 
by the executive branch has been to increase military voting participation dramatically.  
While historically, the military turnout rate has been significantly lower than that of the 
civilian population, in recent years military voting exceeds that of the general population 










Chapter 5:  Data Collection and the Survey Instrument 
  
At the core of this study is the question of the reported cultural gap between the 
military and civilian societies.  The theoretical discussion has shown that most writers 
believe that it is necessary for some gap to exist, but it is possible the gap to become 
excessive.  The review of demographics presented the over- and under-representation of 
various segments of the population in the military as well as well as enlistees’ 
geographic dispersion, such that certain regions of the United States provide greater than 
the expected proportion of enlistees, thus potentially exacerbating any gap.  Absentee 
voting is apparently problematic, but the military population votes at a higher rate than 
does the general American population, raising questions as to how the demographic 
composition of the armed forces might affect voting preferences.    
In order to find answers to the questions at the core of this research project, it is 
necessary to determine the voting choices of American military personnel, particularly 
enlisted personnel.  At present, no reliable data exist on the voting behavior of enlisted 
personnel.  The single best study on politics and the military, the TISS survey, did not 
focus on the enlisted ranks but rather concentrated on senior officers and civilian veteran 
and non-veteran elites.  Data from Military Times surveys are helpful, but the authors of 
those reports admitted that their data were not complete and were drawn solely from the 
readership of that newspaper (Trowbridge 2004).  Thus, it became necessary to develop 









The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains detailed databases on its 
personnel, both military and civilian.  Demographic data such as race, ethnicity, gender, 
home of record, and educational attainment are collected and made available to users by 
the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) in Arlington, Virginia.  DMDC is 
assigned to the Under Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Readiness (OUSD 
M&R), a principal assistant to the Secretary of Defense.  Access to data by non-federal 
governmental requestors is normally provided via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
requests.  For the purposes of this research project, and because of the researcher’s 
former active-duty military status, a special arrangement with OUSD M&R provided 
exceptional access to the database without an attendant requirement to use the FOIA.  
Data was normally provided within two days following requests to DMDC.  Unless 
noted as having come from a standard DMDC report, all personnel data came to the 
researcher in the form of Microsoft Excel files from DMDC. 
U.S. law prohibits the polling of active-duty military personnel about their voting 
practices (U.S. Code, Title 18 1948).  Proxies for that information, based on earlier 
electoral behavioral research, must therefore be used.  The best such proxies are party 
identification and ideology, which have proven over time to be exceptionally accurate 
predictors of voting choices.  As the law does not prohibit asking such proxy questions, 
to do so is technically legal, but the military services are wary of any questioning of 
active-duty personnel on political matters and the services generally refuse to cooperate 









A letter was sent to the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, Dr. David 
S. C. Chu, requesting the cooperation of the Department of Defense (DOD).  (See 
Appendix E for a copy of this letter.)  The response indicated that, while the DOD 
thought the project was worthwhile, regulations prevented direct support.  However, the 
suggestion was made to contact other individuals within the office who might provide 
some unofficial support.   
Contact with those individuals resulted in information about a number of other 
offices, both within and outside the Department of Defense, which were able to provide 
suggestions on how to contact an audience of enlisted personnel without the necessity of 
using DOD channels.  While being unable to obtain direct access to active-duty 
personnel with assistance from the Department of Defense was a setback, the unofficial 
contacts enabled access to resources that led to more potential survey respondents.   
Anticipating such resistance from the DOD, alternative methods of reaching the 
target population had previously been determined, based not only on the information 
provided by the Department of Defense, but also on my own lengthy active-duty service 
in the United States Navy.  Several commanding officers whom I knew were most 
helpful despite knowing that the Department of Defense and the military services were 
not officially supporting the study.  The result of those contacts was good access to the 
Navy and the Marine Corps and somewhat less access to the Army and Air Force. 
Another means of contact was a social networking website, 
TogetherWeServed.com, which caters to active-duty and veteran military personnel.  









respondents, most of whom are current and former Navy personnel.  Friends and family 
currently on active duty in the other services helped provide access to Marine Corps and 
Army personnel via the same website.  All those I contacted were asked to direct 
potential respondents to the website I established for the survey. 
Because access to more potential respondents was needed, email was also used.  
Contacts with several acquaintances still on active duty in the various services led to 
compilation of a list of 1,657 email addresses known to be of active-duty military 
personnel.  A solicitation email was sent to those subjects, and 482 responses were 
obtained, a 29.1 percent response rate, with just over half of those responses from 
active-duty personnel.  A small number of surveys (46) were administered in person 
with a paper instrument to military personnel encountered by the author during the 
course of daily work in central Texas.22   
The website CivMilResearch garnered another 568 responses.  A special survey 
administered to the active-duty enlisted personnel at the Naval Reserve Officer Training 
Corps Units at two universities, the University of Texas at Austin and Auburn 
University, resulted in 39 respondents.  Another 83 responses were obtained by a 
combination of telephone interviews and responses to emails to various associations 
known to have numerous active-duty enlisted personnel as members.  Thirty-eight 
responses were deleted by the author after determining they were submitted by those 
                                                 
 
 
22 Of the total hand-completed survey instruments, 45 were military personnel in the Austin area, mostly 
assigned to Camp Mabry.  Another 34 were from San Antonio, mostly from Randolph Air Force Base 
with some from Fort Sam Houston.  An additional 12 were from the Texas National Guard on permanent 









who had never been in the military, were obviously faked, or were not sufficiently 
complete. 
Several hundred responses were obtained by using the social networking website 
Facebook.23  A paid advertisement was arranged that put a link on the homepages of all 
members of Facebook who indicated a connection with the military.  The advertisement 
was left active for about six weeks and resulted in responses from a large number of 
active duty personnel, particularly from the U.S. Army and Army National Guard. 
The survey instrument was hosted online by servers at Survey Monkey, a 
professional online survey development company.  The collected data were downloaded 
in a Microsoft Excel format and with some manual modification to the variable names in 
the file, imported into SPSS for analysis.  Survey Monkey also provides an online means 
of rudimentary analysis, including filtering and a limited ability to cross tabulate.  
SURVEY SUBJECTS 
The survey resulted in 2,652 valid respondents, all of whom are or were active-
duty American military personnel.  Of the respondents, 1,452 were on active duty with 
the remainder being non-active-duty veterans or Guard/Reserve personnel.  The veteran 
group was made up of three subgroups: (1) retired military, (2) National Guard or 
Reserve personnel not currently on active-duty, and (3) other formerly active-duty 
personnel now discharged from active service.  Of the active-duty personnel, 1,243 were 
enlisted personnel, the primary target of this study.  The sample is summarized in Table 
5.1 below. 
                                                 
 
 









Table 5.1: Summary of Survey Responses 
 
Source Response Active Veteran Invalid 
Officer Enlisted Officer Enlisted 
Email 482 46 214 5 201 16 
Hand 46 0 39 0 7 0 
Website 2,040 159 894 167 800 20 
NROTCU 39 2 37 0 0 0 
Other 83 2 59 13 7 2 
Total 2,690 209 1,243 185 1,015 38 
 
The distribution of the active-duty respondents by gender, service, and pay-grade 
reveals that the senior pay-grades (E-5 and up) were over-represented in the survey.  
(See Tables 5.2 and 5.3.)  This distribution is similar to that of the Military Times’ 
electronically administered surveys.  The reason for the lack of participation by the most  
junior enlisted personnel (E-3 and below) is unknown, but it is likely due to lack of 
access to computers during normal duty hours as well as differing internet use by that 
age group.  Research by the Pew Internet and American Life Project indicates that 
younger internet users are more likely to use social networking sites, rather than email, 
for communication (Lenhart & Madden, 2007).  Of 55 emails sent to known E-3 and 
below personnel, only seven garnered a response.  The best response was from the paid 
advertisement on Facebook, which, along with TogetherWeServed, yielded another 88 
responses.  Ultimately, a total of 262 E-4 and below responded to the survey, or about 
21 percent of all active duty enlisted responses. 
Over a sixth (16.7 percent) of the sample was female (see Table 5.2), a 









population, which is 14 percent.  As with the overall sample, the female sample was 
skewed to the more senior ranks but at about the same proportion as the male sample.  
The distribution of respondents by service showed over-representation of the Navy, 
perhaps not surprising given the service connection of the researcher, and under-
representation of the Air Force (See Table 5.3).  While the over-representation of 
respondents from the Navy is easily explained by the author’s career in that service as 
well as holding a senior rank that permitted access not easily obtained by other 
researchers, that service connection did not yield similar results with the Army or Air 
Force.  It did, however, yield some good response from the Marine Corps.  The Marine 
Corps has proven to be the most resistant to political surveying of its personnel, to 
include the TISS surveys.   
 




E-1 E-2 E-3 E-4 E-5 E-6 E-7 E-8 E-9 Total Proportion 
Male 0 7 80 164 191 231 251 68 43 1035 83% 
Female 1 5 2 3 37 134 10 9 7 208 17% 















Table 5.3 Active-duty Enlisted Sample by Pay-grade and Service 
Pay-
grade 
E-1 E-2 E-3 E-4 E-5 E-6 E-7 E-8 E-9 Total Proportion 
Army 1 12 10 60 90 95 74 27 7 376 30% 
Navy 0 0 21 31 54 186 86 8 9 395 32% 
Marine 0 0 51 55 30 54 34 16 9 249 20% 
Air Force 0 0 0 21 54 30 67 26 25 223 18% 
Total 1 12 82 167 228 365 261 77 50 1243 100% 
 
An examination of the race or ethnicity of respondents shows a slight under-
representation of whites (66 percent) and blacks (only 16 percent of those responding) 
and an over-representation of other races (18 percent) (see Tables 5.4 and 5.5).  Non-
proportional representation in the sample will be compensated for during analysis by use 
of weighting based on the known population distribution. 
 
Table 5.4 Active-duty Enlisted Sample by Service and Race 
Pay-
grade 
Army Navy Marine AF Total Proportion 
White 231 166 110 107 614 66% 
Black 28 64 44 10 146 16% 
Other 54 45 21 51 171 18% 











Table 5.5 Active-duty Enlisted Sample by Race and Gender 
  Male  Female  Total 
        N  Pct          N    Pct          N   Pct 
White  541  58% 73 8% 614 66% 
Black  92  10% 54 6% 146 16% 
Other  153  16% 18 2% 171 18% 
Total  786  84% 145 16% 931 100% 
 
Totals may not add due to rounding 
 
 
The data-collection period for SOEP began August 23, 2008, and ended March 
26, 2009, a period of 216 days, or about seven months, with a midpoint of December 8, 
2008.  For purposes of comparison to the active-duty military population, the end-
strength as reported by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) on November 30, 
2008, will be used.  The numbers of each of the six demographic groups used in the 
present study as reported on that date as well as the respective percentage of the total is 
shown in Table 5.6. 
 






Ethnicity  Males  Females  Total Males Females Total 
White  715,966  88,313  804,279 61% 8% 69% 
Black  166,710  50,890  217,600 14% 4% 19% 
Other  120,838  24,666  145,504 10% 2% 12% 
Total  1,003,514  163,869  1,167,383 86% 14% 100% 
 
Source: DMDC, January 15, 2009 
Totals may not add due to rounding 
  
The percentages in Table 5.6 will be used as the weights for each of the 









was black male (see Table 5.5), for the purposes of analysis, that subgroup will be 
weighted as though it were 14 percent of the sample.  In this case, once any given 
characteristics have been determined for black males, the impact of that subsample will 
be applied to the entire sample by increasing its effect by a factor of 1.4 (14/10).  The 
same procedure will be applied to the other five demographic subgroups.      
SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
The questions in the survey instrument were drawn primarily from the Triangle 
Institute for Strategic Studies’ “Survey on the Military in the Post Cold War Era.”24  
Additional questions from the American National Election Study (ANES) were also 
used, as were some general demographic questions devised by the author based on 
similar questions in standard survey instruments.  The questions were purposely 
designed to be identical or as close as possible to those used in other studies, to enable 
direct comparisons between the data from this study and those collected by earlier 
studies. 
The initial question, which asked if the respondent would voluntarily participate 
in the survey, was followed by the RIGHT DIRECTION/WRONG TRACK question 
from ANES.25  The next two items were typical questions about political efficacy, also 
                                                 
 
 
24 Peter D. Feaver, Richard H. Kohn, and Lindsay P. Cohn, "Introduction," Soldiers and Civilians: The 
Civil-Military Gap and American National Security, Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds., 
[Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001].  Janet Newcity, “Description of the 1998 – 1999 TISS Surveys on the 
Military in the Post Cold War Era.”  Paper prepared for the TISS Project on the Gap Between Military and 
Civilian Society, 1999.  Retrieved 15 Augusst 2008 from 
http://www.poli.duke.edu/civmil/newcity_survey_description.pdf. 
25 ANES 2008 Pre-election Questionnaire, question A13, “Do you feel things in this country are generally 
going in the RIGHT DIRECTION, or do you feel things have pretty seriously gotten off on the WRONG 










from the National Election Study, asking whether the respondent believed the political 
process was too complicated and whether voting mattered.26  Because these questions 
had been asked of the general population by the National Election Study during the same 
time period as the present survey, direct comparisons of the responses of service 
personnel to those of the general U.S. population was possible. 
The next questions were drawn directly from the Triangle Institute survey.  The 
specific questions were selected to determine attitudes of the enlisted military population 
as compared to those of the officer corps, known from previous studies.  Because the 
sample actually collected included a large number of veterans in addition to the active-
duty personnel, comparisons of attitudinal differences in views of military and civilian 
cultures between those on active duty and veterans were possible. 
Questions 4 through 15 asked whether a series of terms applied or did not apply 
to either the military or civilian culture.  Questions 16 through 27 asked the respondent’s 
opinion on whether a series of statements about the military hurt or had no effect on 
military effectiveness.  Questions 28 through 37 asked whether the respondent agreed or 
disagreed with a series of statements that people have made about the American 
military.  Questions 38 through 42 sought the respondent’s opinion on a number of 
statements concerning the military’s role in civilian society.  Finally, questions 43 
through 52 asked for opinions about statements concerning the relationship between 
civilian and military society.  These last two sets of questions would ultimately provide 
the best insight into attitudes about the civil-military relationship.   
                                                 
 
 
26 ANES 2008 Pre-election Questionnaire, question E9a. “Sometimes, politics and government seem so 










The final series of TISS-based questions asked about the respondent’s attitude 
toward the military service and reasons for enlisting in the first place.  The survey ended 
with a set of questions, developed by the author and based on TISS and other surveys, 
on various demographic signifiers such as race, ethnicity, gender, home of record, 
educational level, and parental education level, as well as political ideology and party 
identification.    
 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SURVEY 
After initial development in paper format, the survey instrument was converted 
to the online format on Survey Monkey.  A limited number of military acquaintances 
were asked to respond as a preliminary test.  That experience led to further 
modifications to the format and the questions, resulting in a second online version, 
which version was provided to the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps Units at the 
University of Texas and at Auburn University.  All 46 active-duty enlisted personnel in 
those two programs were invited to participate, resulting in 37 responses for an 80.4 
percent response rate.27  Two officers, the Commanding Officers of those respective 
NROTC Units, also provided responses that were added to the officer database.  Based 
on that experience, additional modifications were made to the questionnaire, and the 
final version was subsequently developed.  Once posted online, the survey was made 
available for the project.   
                                                 
 
 
27 The respondents were Navy Seaman To Admiral 21 (STA-21) and Marine Enlisted Commissioning 
Education Program (MECEP) participants, all of whom were enlisted personnel on active-duty receiving 
officer candidate education and training in the Naval Reserve Officer Corps.  NROTC Midshipmen, who 









The responses obtained from the first online version were not included in this 
study, as most came from officer personnel some of the questions showed significant 
format differences from the later versions.  Responses from the second version, 
completed almost entirely by enlisted personnel, were included as all the questions were 
identical to the final version.  Some minor modifications to the database from version 
two of the survey were required to ensure that it imported successfully into SPSS with 
the data from the third, and final, survey.  Two questions asked in the final version of the 
survey were not asked in the second.  The text of the final version of the survey is 










Chapter 6:  Findings and Analysis 
  
The principal purpose of the Survey on Enlisted Personnel (SOEP) was to 
generate data that would lead to answers for the research questions posed earlier in this 
dissertation.  The two questions are: 
1. To what extent do the political attitudes and behavior of enlisted 
personnel differ from or resemble those of the officer corps and the 
general American population? 
2. If enlisted personnel do identify more with the Republican Party than 
does the American population, what factors would explain such attitudes 
and behavior? 
Answering the first question requires determining the party identification and 
political ideology of active-duty enlisted personnel and then comparing those findings 
with what is known about other groups, specifically the officer corps and the general 
American population.  Additionally, given the information available from the data 
acquired through the survey, a comparison also can be made between the attitudes and 
behavior of active-duty enlisted personnel and those of veteran enlisted personnel.  
Whether an answer is required for the second question depends on what is discovered 











RESEARCH QUESTION #1: PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND IDEOLOGY 
 
The first course of action is to determine the party identification (PID) of active-
duty enlisted personnel and to compare the findings with the party identification of 
veteran enlisted personnel, officers, and the general American population.  In the survey, 
respondents self-reported party identification on a seven-point scale – Strong 
Republican, Moderate Republican, Independent-Leaning Republican, Independent, 
Independent-Leaning Democrat, Moderate Democrat, and Strong Democrat.  Other 
party identifications were scored as Independents.  In order to analyze the results 
accurately, sampling errors, specifically those for race and gender, were corrected by 
weighting each of six subgroups – white males, white females, black males, black 
females, other males, and other females – in accordance with their proportion in the 
active-duty enlisted population.  (See Table 5.6.).   
The PID comparison of the various groups is based on five samples.  The 
samples of active-duty personnel and veteran enlisted personnel were drawn from the 
present survey (SOEP) as was the modern officer sample.  The civilian sample was 
drawn from the American National Election Study for 2008 (ANES 2008) survey data.  
For purposes of comparison to previous research, officer attitudes were also drawn from 
the 1998 TISS survey.   
 The second course of action was to determine the political ideology of active-
duty enlisted personnel and compare the findings to the political ideology of veteran 
enlisted personnel, officers, and the general American population.  Respondents’ self-









Middle of the Road, Somewhat Conservative, and Strongly Conservative.  As with party 
identification, each demographic subgroup will be weighted appropriately to correct for 
sampling errors.  Finally, along with the determination of party identification and 
political ideology, any reported shifts in PID since September 11, 2001, will be explored 
as will questions of political efficacy among the comparison groups. 
 
Party Identification.  The data obtained by the SOEP from active-duty enlisted 
personnel were divided into the six demographic subgroups.  The reported party 
identification was applied to the total number of enlisted personnel in each subgroup, 
and three broad categories were produced: Republican, Democrat, and 
Independent/Other.  Those who reported identifying as Republican or Democratic were 
further divided into the categories of strong, moderate, or leaning.  In the case of the 
TISS officer sample, only the three broad categories of Democrat, Republican, or 
Independent/Other were available. 
 
Results.  About 41 percent of the weighted active-duty enlisted sample reported a 
Republican PID.  (See Table 6.1)  About 24 percent reported a Democratic PID, while 
about 35 percent reported identifying as Independent or having some party identification 
other than Republican or Democrat.  The 2008 ANES study reported the general 
American population having a Republican PID of about 43 percent, only two percent 
different from active-duty enlisted personnel.  However, it also reported a Democratic 









Active-duty enlisted personnel were about three times more likely than the general 
population to report themselves as Independent/Other.  A greater proportion of the 
civilian sample reported a strong or moderate partisan position (Republican – 76 
percent; Democrat – 76 percent) than did the active-duty enlisted sample (Republican – 
66 percent; Democrat 71 percent).  Thus, it would appear that active-duty enlisted 
personnel, while identifying with the Republican Party in about the same proportion as 
the general population, are less likely to be strong partisans (either Republican or 
Democrat) and more likely to report being Independent.  Enlisted personnel are also 
substantially less likely than civilians to identify with the Democratic Party. 
 
Table 6.1 Party Identification 











Strong Republican  11  14  ‐  12  18 
Moderate Republican  16  18  ‐  32  15 
Lean Republican  14  12  ‐  8  9.28 
Total Republican  41  44  60  52  43 
           
Independent  35  32  28  16  12 
Lean Democrat  7  7  ‐  12  11 
Moderate Democrat  10  8  ‐  4  15 
Strong Democrat  7  9  ‐  16  19 
Total Democrat  24  24  11  32  45 
     
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
N =  1195  1079  1086  209  1617 
 
 
Sources: Officers (1998) from TISS data, Civilians from ANES 2008 data.   
All other data from the SOEP 










The finding of a smaller proportion of Democrats than in the general population 
while the proportion of Republicans was about the same as in the general population led 
to calculation of a ratio of Republicans to Democrats (partisan ratio) and the ratio of 
Independents to those who identify with a political party (independent ratio.)  (See Table 
6.2.)   











Partisan Ratio (R/D)  1.7:1 1.8:1 5.5:1 1.6:1  .95:1 
Independent Ratio (I/R+D)  .54:1 .41:1 .39:1 .19:1  .14:1 
 
Data for calculations drawn from Table 6.1 
 
Active-duty enlisted personnel demonstrate a 1.7 to 1 partisan ratio 
(Republican:Democrat), a ratio similar to that found in the veteran enlisted (1.8 to 1) and 
the 2008 officer sample (1.6 to 1).  The civilian sample shows a .95 to 1 partisan ratio.  
Thus, active-duty enlisted personnel who identify with a political party are about twice 
as likely as civilians to identify with the Republican Party.  However, active-duty 
enlisted personnel are nearly four times as likely as civilians to report being 
independent.  Active-duty enlisted personnel are substantially less likely than civilians to 
identify with the Democratic Party.  The Republican-to-Democrat ratio may well explain 
the observations of a Republican dominated military.  Despite the fact that the overall 
proportion of Republicans within the military is no greater than that found within the 
general population, that there are twice as many individuals who will state that they are 









impression of a heavily Republican population.  However, active-duty enlisted personnel 
remain strongly independent when compared to the civilian population. 
The skewness of partisanship toward the Republican Party can be partially 
explained by the relatively high number of recruits who come from parts of the country 
in which the Republican Party maintains a strong following, i.e., the South and 
Mountain states (see Chapter 3, especially Table 3.6).  Many of the regions of the United 
States that have a strong Democratic Party following – the Northeast and parts of the 
Midwest – are not as strongly represented among recruits.  Why so many Independents 
are found within the military is not as easy to explain, but it may stem from the laws that 
restrict open involvement of military personnel in political activity and the enforced 
apolitical environments on military bases and ships. 
Another likely explanation for the lack of Democratic identifiers in the military 
may be self-selection.  A comparison of statistics between Texas and California, two 
states that combined produce over one-fifth of all recruits annually, reveals just how 
powerful is the effect of self-selection.  Texas, a state that typically produces a 
Republican majority in general elections, produces about 11 percent of all recruits, and 
California, a state that typically votes Democratic, produces about 10 percent of recruits 
each year.  Of personnel hailing from Texas, about 63 percent report a Republican Party 
Identification (PID).  About 20 percent reported being independent, while only about 17 
percent reported a Democratic PID.  In California, about 35 percent report a Republican 
PID while over 50 percent report being independent, and only a miniscule 5 percent of 









itself in other traditionally Democratic-voting states such as Washington and Oregon, 
where 44 percent of enlisted personnel from those states report being independent while 
less than 18 percent report being Democrats.  Republicans make up about 38 percent of 
Washingtonian and Oregonian enlisted personnel.   
 
Party Identification Findings – Active Duty Enlisted   
Finding #1: American military enlisted personnel are less strongly partisan than 
the general American population. 
Finding #2: American military enlisted personnel are about as likely as the 
general American population to identify with the Republican Party. 
Finding #3:  American military enlisted personnel are about half as likely as the 
general American population to identify with the Democratic Party. 
Finding #4: American military enlisted personnel are about four times as likely as 
the general American population to report themselves as independents or 
as identifying with a party other than the Republican or Democratic 
Parties.  
 
Officers.  Previous research has shown that over 60 percent of the officer corps 
identified with the Republican Party and that about 11 percent identified with the 
Democratic Party, with about 28 percent identifying  as Independent/Other (Davis 2001, 
104).  In order to see what changes may have occurred in officer PID in the ten years 









the SOEP.  The more recent data show that a Republican bias remains within the officer 
corps, although identification with the Democratic Party appears to have been 
significantly higher in 2008 than was found to be the case in 1998.  However, it is 
premature to conclude much from a comparison of the two samples because of the small 
size of the SOEP officer sample, the heavy weighting of the TISS sample with senior 
officers, the occurrence of the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, and the presidential 
candidacy of Barack Obama.   
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq likely have had at least two simultaneous 
effects – intensification of support for the Republican Party by those who previously 
identified with that party and intensification of alienation with the Republican Party by 
those who had previously identified with the Democratic Party or had been independent.  
The candidacy of Barack Obama has most likely increased support of the Democratic 
Party on the part of black service personnel along with their simultaneous alienation 
from the Republican Party.  The drop in black recruits following September 11, 2001, is 
a strong indicator of dissatisfaction with the Republican administration’s policies on the 
part of the black community. 
 
Party Identification Findings - Officers 
Finding #5: American military officers are more likely to identify with the 
Republican Party than does the general American population. 
Finding #6: American military officers are less likely to identify with the 









Finding #7: American military officers are more likely than enlisted personnel to 
identify with the Republican Party. 
Finding #8: American military officers are less likely than enlisted personnel to 
identify as independents or with a party other than the Republican or 
Democratic Parties. 
 
Veteran Enlisted Personnel.  A large number of respondents to the SOEP were enlisted 
personnel who are now veterans (N=1079).  This provided an opportunity to detect 
differences between the attitudes of those still on active duty and those who have since 
left active duty.  As one might expect, there is great similarity between the two samples, 
but enlisted personnel on active duty as of  2008 were more likely to report identifying 
as independent than did the veterans.  Veterans reported a Republican PID at about the 
same rate as the general population, but were much less likely to identify as Democrats.  
 
Party Identification Findings – Veteran Enlisted Personnel 
Finding #9: Veteran enlisted personnel are less likely than active-duty enlisted 
personnel to identify as independents or with a party other than the 
Republican or Democratic Parties. 
Finding #10: Veteran enlisted personnel are about twice as likely as the general 
American population to identify as independents or with a party other 









To present the gap data more graphically, we subtract the proportions of each 
category (Republican, Independent, and Democrat) within each of the various 
comparison groups from the active-duty enlisted proportions and show the result as a 
difference plot or gap.  (See Figure 6.1)  A bar reaching in the positive (up) direction is a 
category in which the active-duty enlisted sample has demonstrated a higher proportion 
than the comparison group.  A bar reaching in the negative (down) direction is a 
category in which the active-duty enlisted sample has demonstrated a lower proportion 
than the comparison group.  As discussed above and clearly shown in Figure 6.1, active-
duty enlisted personnel are more likely than any of the other sample groups to report 
identifying as independent.  The figure also shows that enlisted personnel are less likely 
to identify with the Republican Party than any of the comparison groups and, with the 


















Figure 6.1 Party Identification Gap Analysis 
Comparison of Veteran Enlisted, Officers (1998), Officers (2008), and Civilians  




Party Identification Shifts Since September 11, 2001 
The data obtained by the SOEP suggests a shift in party identification among 
officers between 1998 and 2008.  In order to understand better the dynamics of party 
identification among enlisted personnel, it was helpful to determine if any change had 
occurred in recent years.  As no previous survey of enlisted personnel had been 
conducted, it was necessary to find an alternative method to detect any changes that may 
have occurred.  Given the suggestion that the events of September 11, 2001, and the 
subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq may have had either an intensification of 
























self-report if they had experienced any shift in party identification.  The SOEP asked 
two questions:  
Q #69.  Has your party identification changed over the past seven years?  
 The available responses were “Yes,” “No,” or “Don’t Know.” 
Q #70.  Since the events of 9/11 and the U.S. involvement in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, would you say that you are (1) more strongly Democrat, (2) 
less strongly Democrat, (3) more strongly Republican, (4) less strongly 
Republican, (5) switched from Democrat to Republican, (6) switched 
from Republican to Democrat, (7) Are more strongly independent than 
before, (8) are less strongly independent than before, and (9) haven’t 
moved/don’t know. 
The data available from the SOEP permitted analysis of reported PID changes by 
active-duty enlisted personnel, veteran enlisted personnel, and officers.  As no similar 
questioning had been conducted of the general American population, it was not possible 
to compare the military population with civilians.   
The first analysis was a cross-tabulation of reported PID with reported change in 
PID.  Among active-duty enlisted Republicans, 84 percent ((22+16)/45) reported either 
being more strongly Republican or no change in intensity of PID, whereas among 
Democrats, 77 percent ((12+5)/22) reported being either more strongly Democrat or no 
change in intensity of PID.  Among Independents, 88 percent ((15+14)/33) reported 
either being more independent or no change.  Among veteran enlisted Republicans, 78 









whereas among Democrats, 78 percent ((13+4)/23) reported being either more strongly 
Democrat or no change.  Among Independents, 89 percent ((18+6)/27) reported either 
being more independent or no change.  Among officer Republicans, 84 percent 
((32+14)/55) reported either being more strongly Republican or no change in PID, 
whereas among Democrats, 65 percent ((17+2)/29) reported being either more strongly 
Democrat or no change.  Among Independents, 75 percent ((8+3)/16) reported either 
being more independent or no change.   
Thus, in the case of both active-duty and veteran enlisted personnel, over three-
quarters of the sample reported either no change in PID or strengthening of a pre-
existing PID.  Among active-duty enlisted personnel, the data suggest less of that effect 
with Democrats than with veteran enlisted personnel, where the data suggests the effect 
is more pronounced among independents than among Republicans or Democrats.  In the 
case of officers, the effect is most pronounced among Republicans.  (See Table 6.3.) 
Party Identification Change Findings 
Finding #11:  Over three-quarters of active-duty enlisted personnel and veteran 
enlisted personnel report either an intensification of or no change in party 
identification since September 11, 2001. 
Finding #12:  Republican active-duty enlisted personnel and officers are more 
likely than veteran enlisted personnel to report either an intensification of 
or no change Republican PID than did Democratic active-duty enlisted 









Finding #13:  Independent veteran enlisted personnel are more likely than 
officers or active-duty enlisted personnel to report either an 
intensification of or no change being Independent. 
 
Table 6.3 Shift in Party Identification by PID 
Active-duty Enlisted, Veteran Enlisted, and Officers 
 
















Republican  0%  0%  22%  3%  2%  0%  2%  0%  16%  45% 
Independent  0%  0%  2%  1%  0%  1%  15%  0%  14%  33% 
Democrat  12%  1%  0%  0%  0%  1%  2%  0%  5%  22% 
Total  13%  1%  24%  4%  3%  2%  19%  0%  35%  100% 
N=878                     
                     
















Republican  0%  0%  28%  4%  1%  0%  5%  0%  11%  50% 
Independent  1%  0%  1%  0%  0%  0%  18%  0%  6%  27% 
Democrat  13%  0%  1%  0%  0%  1%  2%  0%  5%  23% 
Total  14%  1%  31%  4%  1%  2%  25%  0%  22%  100% 
N=844                     
                     
















Republican  0%  0%  32%  5%  0%  0%  3%  0%  14%  55% 
Independent  0%  0%  2%  2%  0%  0%  8%  0%  3%  16% 
Democrat  17%  0%  1%  0%  0%  2%  7%  0%  2%  29% 
Total  17%  0%  35%  8%  0%  2%  18%  0%  19%  100%
N=173                     
 
 
While the absolute shift in party identification is revealing, a comparison of gaps 
between various sample groups, or gap analysis, highlights differences between the three 









change in PID than either veteran enlisted personnel or officers.  Active-duty enlisted 
personnel are also less likely than either veteran enlisted personnel or officers to being 
more partisan, i.e., more Republican or more Democrat and were more likely to report 
being Independent.   
The data also suggest that active-duty enlisted personnel may be slightly more 
likely than either veteran enlisted personnel or officers to have switched party 
identification.  This tendency is about 2.5 times more likely among junior enlisted 
personnel (E-1 through E-5) than with senior enlisted personnel (E-6 through E-7), 
which would be consistent with older individuals having more stable PID.  The total 
number of individuals reporting such a switch in PID from Democrat to Republican is 
small (22, or less than 3% of the sample), but a smaller number (16, or less than 2 











Table 6.4 PID Change Gap Analysis 
















Republican  0%  0%  ‐7%  ‐1%  2%  0%  0%  0%  4%  ‐5% 
Independent  ‐1  0%  1%  1%  0%  0%  0%  0%  8%  7% 
Democrat  ‐1  0%  ‐1%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  ‐1% 
Total  ‐1%  0%  ‐7%  0%  2%  0%  0%  0%  13%   
                     
















Republican  0%  0%  ‐11%  ‐2%  2%  0%  ‐1%  0%  2%  ‐10% 
Independent  0%  0%  0%  ‐1%  0%  1%  7%  0%  11%  18% 
Democrat  ‐5%  1%  ‐1%  0%  0%  ‐1%  ‐5%  0%  4%  ‐8% 
Total  ‐5%  1%  ‐12%  ‐3%  3%  0%  1%  0%  16%  0% 
 
Active-duty Enlisted minus Veteran Enlisted 
Active-duty Enlisted minus Officers 
 
Party Identification Change Gap Analysis Findings 
Finding #14:  Active-duty enlisted personnel are less likely than veteran enlisted 
personnel or officers to report any change in PID. 
Finding #15:  Active-duty enlisted personnel are less likely than veteran enlisted 
personnel or officers to report an intensification of PID. 
Finding #16: Active-duty enlisted personnel are slightly more likely than veteran 
enlisted personnel or officers to report having changed PID from the 
Democratic Party to the Republican Party. 
 
Political Ideology.  Respondents were asked to report their political ideology on a five-









somewhat liberal, and strongly liberal.  Using methodology similar to that used above, 
the reported political ideology of each demographic subgroup was calculated and then 
summarized with the appropriate weighting.  The proportions for the categories were 
determined for each of the same five sample groups: active-duty enlisted personnel, 
veteran enlisted personnel, officers (1998), officers (2008), and civilians.  The results are 
summarized in Table 6.5. 
 
Table 6.5 Political Ideology 












Strongly Conservative  19  18  13  23  24 
Somewhat Conservative  19  30  51  29  15 
Total Conservative  38  48  64  51  38 
           
Middle of the Road  34  29  28  19  32 
           
Somewhat Liberal  18  18  7  15  12 
Strongly Liberal  10  5  1  15  18 
Total Liberal  28  23  8  30  30 
     
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
N=  1200  1085  1199  206  1626 
 
Sources: Officers (1998) from TISS (1998) data, Civilians from ANES 2008 data.   
All other data from the SOEP 
Totals may not add due to rounding 
 
 
Findings.  The political ideology of active-duty enlisted personnel is roughly similar to 
that reported by the general American population in the 2008 ANES study, but the 
general population sample is more likely to report being either “strongly liberal” or 









themselves as moderate or “middle of the road.”  As with PID, ideological ratios reveal 
differences between the comparison groups.  Active-duty enlisted personnel report about 
the same conservative to liberal ratio (1.4 to 1) as does the civilian population (1.3 to 1).  
Both of those ratios are not as high as those shown with veteran enlisted personnel (2.1 
to 1), the 1998 officer sample (8 to 1), and the 2008 officer sample (1.7 to 1).  Active-
duty enlisted personnel also demonstrate a likelihood similar to that of the civilian 
population of reporting themselves as Independent.  So, while active-duty enlisted 
personnel are more likely to be Republicans than Democrats, they are quite similar to 
the general population when it comes to ideology.  See Table 6.6. 
 











Conservative : Liberal Ratio  1.4:1 2.1:1 8:1 1.7:1  1.3:1 
Moderate Ratio (M/C+L)  .52:1 .41:1 .39:1 .23:1  .47:1 
 
Data for calculations drawn from Table 6.5 
 
Political Ideology Findings – Active Duty Enlisted 
Finding #17: The political ideology of active-duty enlisted personnel is similar to 
that reported by the general American population. 
Finding #18: Active-duty enlisted personnel are more moderate than the general 
American population, being less likely to report themselves as “strongly 










Officers.  Reported ideology is markedly different between active-duty enlisted 
personnel and officers, although the limited data suggests a difference between the 
officers of 1998 and those of 2008.  Officers are more likely than either active-duty 
enlisted personnel or the general American population to report being conservative.  
Indeed, while over half of the officer corps reports being conservative, only about a third 
of active-duty enlisted personnel report being conservative.  However, the 2008 officer 
sample shows a higher likelihood than the officer sample of 1998 of officers reporting as 
liberal.  This may result from some differences between the two samples, particularly 
the inclusion of a higher proportion of junior officers in the SOEP (2008) sample than 
was present in the TISS sample (1998). 
 
Political Ideology Findings - Officers 
Finding #19: Active-duty officers are more likely than enlisted personnel to 
report being conservative. 
Finding #20: Active-duty officers are less likely than enlisted personnel to report 
being middle of the road. 
 
Veteran Enlisted Personnel.  Veteran enlisted personnel are about 10 percent more 
likely than active-duty enlisted personnel to report being conservative and are less likely 
than active-duty enlisted personnel to report being liberal or middle of the road.  This 
may be a result of age cohort effects, as it is known from other studies that personnel 
who enlisted in the 1980s were more likely to report being Republican and conservative 









majority of personnel who enlisted in the 1980s are no longer on active duty, while most 
of those currently on active-duty enlisted in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
 
Political Ideology Findings – Veteran Enlisted Personnel 
Finding #21: Veteran enlisted personnel are more likely than active-duty enlisted 
personnel to report being conservative. 
Finding #22: Veteran enlisted personnel are less likely than active-duty enlisted 
personnel to report being middle of the road. 
Finding #23: Veteran enlisted personnel are less likely than active-duty enlisted 
personnel to report being liberal. 
 
The gap analysis of differences between active-duty enlisted personnel and the 











Figure 6.2 Political Ideology Gap Analysis 
Comparison of Veteran Enlisted, Officers (1998), Officers (2008), and Civilians  






Cross-Tabulation of Party Identification and Political Ideology.  In order to compare 
the groups in more detail, party identification and political ideology are cross-tabulated.  
(See Table 6.7.)  This highlights the distribution of conservative, middle of the road, and 
liberal respondents within the Republican and Democratic Parties as well as among 
independents.  Readily apparent is the expected distribution of conservative Republicans 
and liberal Democrats, but the distribution varies by sample group.  For example, while 
only about one-fourth of active-duty enlisted personnel report being conservative 





















percent report being liberal Democrats as compared to only about 11 percent of active-
duty enlisted personnel.   
 
Political Ideology Gap Analysis Findings 
Finding # 24: Active-duty enlisted personnel who identify with the Republican 
Party demonstrate about the same distribution of ideology as the general 
American population. 
Finding #25: Active-duty enlisted personnel who identify with the Democratic 
Party are less likely than the general American population to report being 
liberal. 
Finding #26: Active-duty enlisted personnel who identify with the Republican 
Party are less likely than veteran enlisted personnel to report being 
conservative. 
Finding #27: Active-duty enlisted personnel who identify with the Democratic 
Party are less likely than officers to report being liberal. 
Finding #28: Active-duty enlisted personnel who identify with the Republican 










Table 6.7 Cross-Tabulation: Party ID and Political Ideology 
 
6.7a Active‐duty Enlisted Sample * 
  Democrat Other Republican Total 
Conservative  0% 6% 28% 34% 
Other  14% 16% 8% 38% 
Liberal  11% 14% 2% 28% 
Total  26% 37% 38% N=1256 
   
6.7b Veteran Enlisted Sample *
  Democrat Other Republican Total 
Conservative  1%  10% 38% 49% 
Other  10% 15% 6% 31% 
Liberal  14% 4% 2% 20% 
Total  25% 30% 46% N=1039 
   
6.7c Officer Sample (TISS 1998) *
  Democrat Other Republican Total 
Conservative  2% 9% 55% 66% 
Other  6% 9% 11% 27% 
Liberal  4% 2% 1% 8% 
Total  12% 20% 67% N=1086 
   
6.7d Officer Sample (2008) *
  Democrat Other Republican Total 
Conservative  0.00% 3% 48% 51% 
Other  3% 13% 4% 20% 
Liberal  29% 0% 0.00% 29% 
Total  32% 16% 52% N=207 
   
6.7e Civilian Sample (ANES 2008) * 
  Democrat  Other  Republican  Total 
Conservative  11%  3%  25%  38% 
Other  19%  5%  7%  32% 
Liberal  26%  2%  3%  30% 
Total  56%  10%  34%  N=1617 
* Sum of all nine cells is 100% 










Gap analysis better highlights the differences.  The active-duty enlisted sample 
was compared with each of the other four sample groups.  Each of the nine cells was 
calculated by subtracting the comparison group proportion from that of the active-duty 
enlisted sample.  A positive result indicates that the active-duty enlisted group had a 
higher proportion of representation in the particular characteristic than was shown in the 
comparison group.  A negative result indicates a lower proportion of representation than 














  Democrat  Other  Republican  Total 
Conservative  0% ‐4% ‐10% ‐15% 
Other  4% 1% 2% 7% 
Liberal  ‐3% 10% 0% 8% 




  Democrat  Other  Republican  Total 
Conservative  ‐1% ‐3% ‐27% ‐31% 
Other  8% 6% ‐4% 11% 
Liberal  7% 12% 1% 20% 




  Democrat  Other  Republican  Total 
Conservative  0% 6% ‐20% ‐13% 
Other  12% 4% 3% 18% 
Liberal  ‐18% 14% ‐2% ‐5% 




  Democrat  Other  Republican Total 
Conservative  ‐10%  4% 3% ‐4% 
Other  ‐4%  10% 0% 6% 
Liberal  ‐15%  13% 0% ‐2% 




Result of each cell calculated by subtracting the respective comparison group from  
the active-duty enlisted sample 













RESEARCH QUESTION #2 
 
Whether the second research question required a response was dependent upon 
the answer to the first.  Had it been determined that enlisted personnel demonstrated 
political attitudes and behavior substantially different from what was predicted by 
demographics, further analysis would have been required.  While the enlisted population 
is substantially less likely than civilians to identify with the Democratic Party, it is more 
likely to report being Independent.  The enlisted population is no more likely to identify 
with the Republican Party, proportionally, than does the civilian population.  As a result, 
the need to provide an answer to the second research question is obviated.  As 
demographics have reasonably predicted the party identification and political ideology 
of the enlisted population, there is subsequently no need to determine causes for 
differences.  Demographics remain, as previous research has suggested, the most reliable 
predictor of political behavior.  The enlisted military population apparently is not the 




As much of the discussion about the culture gap revolved around the voting 
behavior of military enlisted personnel, it is reasonable to explore the political efficacy 
of this population.  Previous research has demonstrated that a strong positive correlation 
exists between high political efficacy and the likelihood that an individual will vote 
(Pinkleton & Austin 1998; Pinkleton & Austin 2001; Pinkleton, Austin, & Fortman 









population translate into standard electoral patterns, it would be helpful to know if the 
usual predictor of high political efficacy is present in this high voter turnout population.  
In order to test this, the SOEP asked the respondents to reply to the following two 
standard internal political efficacy questions: 
Q.2. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like 
me can't really understand what's going on. 
Q.3. So many other people vote in the national election that it doesn't matter 
much to me whether I vote or not. 
  Each respondent was then asked to agree or disagree with the statement across a 
standard five-point scale.  The distribution of responses was calculated for each of seven 
different comparison groups: whites, blacks, other races, males, females, junior enlisted 
personnel, and senior enlisted personnel.  These particular comparison groups were 
chosen to provide a cross-sectional view of differences along racial and gender lines.  
The last two groups, junior and senior enlisted personnel, were chosen to determine the 
existence of any age-related differences.  (See Table 6.9.) 
  For the purposes of the analysis below, junior enlisted personnel are defined as 
pay-grades E-1 through E-5 while senior enlisted personnel are pay-grades E-6 through 
E-9.  Such a categorization is consistent with the practice of the Army, Air Force, and 
Marine Corps, defining E-6 and higher as Senior Non-commissioned officers.  The Navy 
makes the divide between E-6 and E-7, but for the sake of consistency, all four services 











Table 6.9 Active-Duty Enlisted Political Efficacy by Race, Gender, Pay-grade 





Agree Strongly  4%  3%  5%  4%  1%  5%  3% 
Agree Somewhat  11%  4%  8%  8%  9%  12%  6% 
Neither   4%  0%  6%  4%  0%  7%  2% 
Disagree Somewhat  12%  14%  27%  19%  3%  23%  12% 
Disagree Strongly  70%  80%  53%  64%  87%  54%  77% 
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
N =  652  292  295  1031  208  489  750 
               





Agree Strongly  6%  10%  0%  5%  8%  9%  4% 
Agree Somewhat  20%  19%  17%  18%  26%  16%  21% 
Neither   8%  0%  2%  5%  1%  4%  5% 
Disagree Somewhat  19%  33%  34%  21%  47%  23%  27% 
Disagree Strongly  47%  38%  47%  50%  19%  48%  43% 
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
  656  292  295  1035  208  493  750 
 
Jr. Enlisted = E1 – E-5; Sr. Enlisted = E6 – E9 
Totals may not add due to rounding 
 
 While variation exists between the groups, overall there appears to be a high 
level of political efficacy in all demographic groups.  Contrary to what has been usually 
found in the national population, blacks demonstrated a higher level of efficacy than did 
whites.  While it is reasonable to assume that the candidacy of Barack Obama in 2008 
was likely a significant factor in a heightened sense of political efficacy among blacks, 
that explanation for the correlation cannot be substantiated because we have no efficacy 
data among military personnel prior to the present survey.  
Senior enlisted personnel demonstrated a higher level of efficacy than did junior 









generally report a higher political efficacy than younger voters (Campbell et al. 1960; 
Verba & Nie 1987; Forrest & Weseley 2007). 
In the 2008 ANES survey, nearly 70 percent of respondents replied that they 
agreed strongly or agreed somewhat that “politics and government seem so complicated 
that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.”  In comparison, only 28 
percent of active-duty enlisted personnel agreed strongly or agreed somewhat with this 
statement, while over 68 percent disagreed strongly or disagreed somewhat with the 
same statement.  Such a marked difference between military and civilian political 
efficacy, combined with documented high voting turnout rates on the part of military 
personnel, may be connected to the efforts on the part of the military to encourage 
voting.  It may also be related to the higher level of education on the part of military 
personnel as compared to the general American population.  
 
Political Efficacy Findings 
Finding #29: American enlisted personnel demonstrated a substantially high 
level of political efficacy when compared to the general American 
population. 
Finding #30: Junior enlisted personnel demonstrated a lower level of political 
efficacy than did senior enlisted personnel. 
Finding #31: Black active-duty enlisted personnel demonstrated a higher level of 












In order to answer the primary research question, this study delved into party 
identification, political ideology, and political efficacy of American military enlisted 
personnel.  Specifically, ten findings were developed on PID along with an additional 6 
findings about apparent shifts in PID since September 11, 2001.  The exploration into 
political ideology resulted in seven findings, and the cross-tabulation of PID and 
ideology resulted in another five findings.  The final investigation into the political 
efficacy of enlisted personnel resulted in three more findings for thirty-one total findings 
from this project. 
American military enlisted personnel are proportionally no more likely than 
civilians to identify with the Republican Party, but are substantially less likely to 
identify with the Democratic Party.  Additionally, enlisted personnel are not as strongly 
partisan, being less likely than other sample groups to report being either “strong 
Democrats” or “strong Republicans.”  Not surprisingly then, enlisted personnel are 
about four times as likely to report being Independent when compared to the civilian 
population.   
Similarly, enlisted personnel are less strongly ideological than the other sample 
groups.  Of those who reported being either liberal or conservative, a higher proportion 
of enlisted personnel reported a more moderate position than the other sample groups.   
Of particular note is the high level of political efficacy suggested by the survey 









military personnel, that such a high efficacy would come from this relatively young age 
group is of interest. 
While the need to provide an answer to the second research question was 
obviated by the results of answering the first question, some issues opened by the 
findings above remain to be explored.  The implications of those findings and 
conclusions drawn from them along with recommendations for further study will be 









Chapter 7:  Conclusions 
The data presented in this study show a difference between the party 
identification of American enlisted personnel and those of civilian Americans.  That 
difference is quite noticeable.  Yet, should this difference be a concern?  The short 
answer is “No”, at least not in terms of any threat, real or perceived, to civilian control 
of the military.  This study discovered that while there are certainly more military 
personnel who identify themselves as Republicans than as Democrats, of particular 
significance are the number of individuals who are politically independent.  That those 
in the military are proportionally three times more likely to be Independents than is true 
for the general population and are also less strongly ideological should be an 
encouraging finding as it supports – although it does not guarantee – the ideal of an 
apolitical, professional military that will respond willingly, if not unquestioningly, to 
civilian control.   
The American military is a distinct population with distinct characteristics.  In 
marked contrast to past conventional wisdom, it is not comprised of the undereducated 
and poor and it is not made up of individuals who are ideologically extreme or 
exceptionally partisan.  And the enlisted personnel who are the overwhelming majority 
and the backbone of the military certainly are not a mirror image of the officer corps in 
terms of demographics, partisanship, and political ideology.  
Why, then, in the face of the information presented here about the political 
attitudes of the military, would an impression of a strongly Republican and intensely 









look first at officers, we see a picture that indeed does track the conventional wisdom of 
Republican dominance in the military.  The TISS surveys demonstrated a strongly 
Republican bias among senior officers in the late 1990s.  The SOEP demonstrated a 
similar, although not as strong, tendency among officers ten years later.  Despite a clear 
leaning toward the Republican Party, the data suggest that junior officers are less likely 
to hold the same conservative ideology and are not as likely to identify with the 
Republican Party as do their seniors.  These findings, while preliminary, do suggest that 
the officer corps is similar to enlisted personnel in both the party identification ratio and 
conservative to liberal ratio, although officers are less likely to report being Independent 
in their party identification. 
However, the real test of whether members of the military are predominantly 
Republican comes from our examination of the enlisted population, who, of course, are 
the overwhelming majority of military personnel.  Without this specialized and unique 
group of people, none of the tasks assigned to the military could be accomplished.  And 
here we find a different picture from the one we have of officers.   
While some of the reporting about the political complexion of the military, and 
particularly of enlisted personnel, may be the result of misinformation being repeated 
unquestioningly, it can also readily be explained by the ratio of those enlisted personnel 
identifying themselves as Republican to those identifying as Democrats.  Although there 
are proportionally no more Republicans among the enlisted military than in the general 
population, the proportion of Democrats is substantially smaller proportion of 









Republican for every one identifying as Democratic, it is not difficult to gain an 
impression of a Republican dominance within the services.  If one combines such a 
skewed perception of the partisan ratio with a senior officer corps that is largely 
Republican, the actual state of partisan identification becomes less easy to discern.  
While it is inaccurate to characterize American military personnel as apolitical, it 
is equally inaccurate to report them as excessively partisan or ideological.  The evidence 
presented here indicates that most enlisted military personnel exhibit a moderate 
ideology and a strong sense of partisan independence, findings that ease concerns about 
any widening of the civil-military gap.  The majority of the American military, and 
certainly active-duty enlisted personnel, do not have partisan or ideological 
identifications fitting only with a narrow partisan section of the population.   
In many ways, American enlisted personnel are reasonably representative of the 
general population.  They are not widely different from civilians in their partisan and 
ideological views and they participate actively in the electoral process.  However, this 
population is substantially less strongly partisan and less strongly ideological, and it 
demonstrates a much higher political efficacy, and, perhaps most significantly, votes at a 
substantially higher rate than do civilians. (See below for further discussion on this 
issue.)    
 The self-selective nature of enlisting in an all-volunteer force likely has a strong 
influence on the lack of presence of Democrats in the military population.  As revealed 
in the review of demographics (see Chapter 3), those regions of the United States that 









recruits per capita.  This is most noticeable for the Northeast, particularly New England.  
At the same time, those regions that in recent elections have been regular Republican 
strongholds produce more than their expected proportion of recruits.  In this case, the 
South, (and within it, particularly Texas), a traditionally conservative region of the 
country, has over-produced recruits.   
Not only do those who identify as Democrats appear to participate in the military 
at a substantially lower rate than do Independents or those who identify as Republicans, 
regions of the country that traditionally produce Democratic majorities are more likely 
to produce recruits who identify politically as Independents.  In contrast, regions that 
regularly produce Republican majorities are more likely to produce recruits with a 
Republican identification.  Over time, this regional effect can account for much of the 
partisan difference observed between the military and civilian populations.  Answering 
why such a phenomenon exists, however, requires future research. 
In addition, younger enlisted personnel are more likely to identify with the 
Democratic Party and to report a liberal political ideology than do older personnel.  The 
first possible explanation is self-selection: members of the military who are more liberal 
and who identify as Democrats decline to re-enlist at higher rates, thus leaving in the 
more senior pay-grades those who are more conservative and more likely to identify as 
Republican.  However, there also may be an age cohort effect in which junior personnel 
are the leading edge of a more liberal and more Democratic enlisted population, with the 
more conservative and Republican senior enlisted personnel being an older age cohort in 









While enlisted personnel may not be as strongly partisan or ideological as are 
civilians, they appear to have voted at a higher rate than does the general American 
population and at a markedly higher rate than civilians under the age of thirty.  The 
exceptionally high stated political efficacy of enlisted personnel suggested by the survey 
findings along with post-election studies reporting voter turnout rates routinely 
exceeding 70 percent, indicate a military population that is politically engaged and 
actively participating in electoral politics.  Such a high participation rate is all the more 
remarkable in light of the fact that about 70 percent of the active duty enlisted 
population is under thirty years of age, a group with a traditionally low voting turnout 
rate.  The 2008 voter turnout rate by individuals 18 to 29 years old in the general 
population was 51.1 percent (McDonald 2009).  The military voter turnout rates for the 
2008 election have not been released, but past behavior indicates that military personnel 
turned out to vote at a substantially higher rate than did civilians  of the same age and 
that their voting rate will likely approach 80 percent.  While a higher voting 
participation rate among military personnel might indicate a higher likelihood of 
intervention in politics - a potential danger to civilian control of the military – the 
military appears to less strongly partisan than the general population and, importantly, 
voting alone does not necessarily imply political activities. 
IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The finding that individuals participating in the military service identify less with 









unidentified variable may be at work.  Candidates for that variable include (1) self-
selection, (2) socialization, and (3) utilitarian attitudes.   
With self-selection, those who identify with the Democratic Party either do not 
enlist at the same rate as Republicans or Independents or have a lower re-enlistment rate.  
In the case of socialization, the proximity of strongly influential senior non-
commissioned officers may influence the political attitudes of enlisted personnel.  While 
some may suggest that commissioned officers may also be a source of political influence 
on junior enlisted personnel, extensive active-duty experience indicates that a non-
commissioned officer has far more effect on the day-to-day life of a junior enlisted 
person and therefore would have more impact on the development of attitudes. 
Utilitarian attitudes may cause an individual to choose an attitude based on the 
perception of which political party will best support the military.  Such attitudes may 
also cause an adaption of one’s political identification as a method to “stay safe” within 
an environment perceived as hostile to one’s own particular political views or just to 
please their seniors.   
The self-perpetuating nature of the military also helps explain the unique nature 
of the enlisted population.  Not only is it likely that non-commissioned officers have a 
strong influence on the attitudes of newly enlisted personnel, but the impact of parents 
with military experience may also be significant (Shields 1996).  Previous research 
indicates that parental influence is a reliable predictor of party identification and 
political ideology of children.  The combination of non-commissioned officers and 









percent of SOEM respondents reported that they would not be disappointed if their child 
joined the military.  This overwhelmingly supportive attitude crossed party identification 
and political ideology lines.  Such a finding supports the idea of a military that is 
significantly self-perpetuating in a manner that crosses partisan and ideological 
boundaries. 
Research into the magnitude of the impact of children of veterans who make up a 
notable part of the present active-duty force may also reveal the affects of generational 
party identification and political efficacy.  While no evidence of such a military “caste” 
within the American population has been presented to date, findings of an increasingly 
“in-bred” military may be predictive of growing cultural isolation from the civilian 
population like the old small professional army stationed at isolated outposts or 
deployed away from home for extended periods.  Further study of any such isolating 
trends within “military communities” surrounding bases could result in interesting 
findings. 
The high sense of political efficacy on the part of enlisted personnel as compared 
to the general population especially within the same age group prompts one to question 
as to why that would be.  Possible answers again lie in self-selection, with those who 
would already demonstrate high political efficacy being more likely to enlist in the first 
place, or socialization, with those who enlist becoming more aware because those 
around them are already politically aware and becoming acutely conscious that political 









parents who had served in the military may also have significant influence.  More work 
is required along these lines. 
To determine the relative impact of potential causal factors on the characteristics 
of enlisted personnel requires additional research.  One avenue of research that promises 
to resolve many of these open questions is a panel study.  Such a study in which some of 
the individuals who responded to the SOEP are followed, along with a group of newly 
enlisted members, may reveal the presence and impact of age cohort, self-selection, 
socialization, and utilitarian attitudinal affects on those on active duty as well as parental 
influence on those entering the military.   
 
* * * * * 
 
 This report limited the analysis primarily to determining the party identification 
and political ideology of active duty enlisted personnel in an attempt better to 
understand the relationship of the military to the civilian population.  A limited look at 
political efficacy supported observations of a politically active military population.  
Remaining unanswered is why those who identify with the Democratic Party participate 
in the military in a substantially lower proportion than do Republicans or Independents.  
Also unanswered is why Independents are found in the military in such a substantially 
higher proportion than is found among civilians.  
 Along with the additional research suggested above, this study has enabled a 









project, the unique characteristics of American military enlisted personnel have been 
highlighted.  Several items of “conventional wisdom” have been challenged with new 
data that leads to a more detailed analysis of American armed forces and the relationship 
of those forces with civilian leaders and democratic society.  With the prospect of 
another decade of fighting ahead in Afghanistan, the American military will remain in 
the forefront of public attention and will remain the subject of continued public policy 
debate.  A full understanding of the American military, and in particular the enlisted 
men or women who actually do the fighting, will become more, not less, important in 










Appendix A: Text of the Survey Instrument 
 
0BSURVEY ON ENLISTED PERSONNEL (SOEP) 
Political Attitudes and Behavior 
 
August 6, 2008 
 
 
I am conducting research into the attitudes and thinking of American military personnel. I 
would very much like to know your opinions.  Your and all other survey responses are 
anonymous, and anything you say will be completely confidential. 
 
Let us begin with a few general questions… 
 
1. Do you feel things in the United States are generally going in the RIGHT DIRECTION, or do 
you feel things have pretty seriously gotten off on the WRONG TRACK? 
 
1. Right direction  
2. Wrong track  
3. Don't know 
 
For the next two items, please tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither 
agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with the statements:   
 
2. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really 
understand what's going on.  
 
1. Agree strongly 
2. Agree somewhat 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Disagree somewhat 
5. Disagree strongly 
6. Don’t know 
 
3.  So many other people vote in the national election that it doesn't matter much to me whether 
I vote or not. 
 
1. Agree strongly 
2. Agree somewhat 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Disagree somewhat 
5. Disagree strongly 












The next set of questions asks you to make some judgments about civilian and military 
culture in this country. First, think of the military culture. Please indicate whether the term applies 
or does not apply. 
 
 Applies Does Not Apply 
4A. Honest   
5A. Intolerant   
6A. Materialistic   
7A. Corrupt   
8A. Generous   
9A. Self-Indulgent   
10A. Hard-Working   
11A. Rigid   
12A. Disciplined   
13A. Creative   
14A. Loyal   
15A. Overly-Cautious   
 
Now, think of the civilian culture. Please indicate whether the same terms as above 
apply or do not apply. 
 
 Applies Does Not Apply 
4B. Honest   
5B. Intolerant   
6B. Materialistic   
7B. Corrupt   
8B. Generous   
9B. Self-Indulgent   
10B. Hard-Working   
11B. Rigid   
12B. Disciplined   
13B. Creative   
14B. Loyal   












There are different things that people say might keep the military from being effective 
during times of war. For each of the following, please indicate if it might greatly hurt military 
effectiveness, somewhat hurt military effectiveness, has no effect on military effectiveness, or it 












16. Americans' lack of 
trust in the uniformed leaders of 
the military 
     
17. The tensions 
created when women enter a 
new workplace 
     
18. The military 
becoming less male-dominated 
     
19. The military getting 
too involved in non-military 
affairs 
     
20. A ban on language 
and behavior that encourage 
camaraderie among soldiers 
     
21. A system for 
promotions and advancement in 
the military that does not work 
well 
     
22. Non-military people 
getting too involved in military 
affairs 
     
23. Sexual harassment 
in the military 
     
24. The military trying 
to hold on to old-fashioned 
views of morality 
     
25. A military culture 
and way of life that is very 
different from that for non-
military      
     
26. The military's lack 
of confidence in our political 
leadership 
     
27. Inaccurate reporting 
about the military and military 
affairs by the news media 











Here are some statements people have made about the American military. For each, 
please indicate whether you agree strongly, agree, somewhat, are neutral, disagree somewhat 














28. An effective military 
depends on a very structured 
organization with a clear 
chain of command 
    
29. Military symbols 
(uniforms, medals) and 
military traditions 
(ceremonies and parades) 
are necessary to build 
morale, loyalty, and 
camaraderie in the military 
    
30. Even though women can 
serve in the military, the 
military should remain 
dominated by male values 
and characteristics 
    
31. The U.S. military has 
done a much better job of 
eliminating racial 
discrimination within the 
military than American 
society in general 
    
32. Even in a high tech era, 
people in the military have to 
have characteristics like 
strength, toughness, physical 
courage, and the willingness 
to make sacrifices 
    
33.  The bonds and sense of 
loyalty that keep a military 
unit together under the 
stress of combat are 
fundamentally different from 
the bonds and loyalty that 
organizations try to develop 
in the business world 
    
34.  The chance to retire with 
a good pension at a young 
age is very important in the 
military 










35. It is very important to 
keep company stores, 
childcare centers, and 
recreational facilities on 
military bases in order to 
keep a sense of community 
    
36. Military leaders care 
more about the people under 
their command than leaders 
in the non-military world care 
about citizens 
    
37. The new emphasis on 
joint education, training, and 
doctrine across branches of 
the military has improved the 
effectiveness of the armed 
forces 
    
 
 
These questions ask for your opinion on a number of statements concerning the 
military's role in civilian society. For each, please indicate whether you agree strongly, agree 












38. Members of the military 
should not publicly criticize 
senior members of the civilian 
branch of the government 
     
39. Members of the military 
should not publicly criticize 
American society 
     
40. Members of the military 
should be allowed to publicly 
express their political views just 
like any other citizen 
     
41. It is proper for the military 
to explain and defend in public 
the policies of the government 
     
42.  It is proper for the military 
to advocate publicly the military 
policies it believes are in the 
best interests of the United 
States 











Here are some statements people have made about the U.S. military. For each, please indicate 













43. Most members of 
the military have a 
great deal of respect 
for civilian society. 
     
44. Most members of 
civilian society have a 
great deal of respect 
for the military. 
     
45. All male citizens 
should be required to 
do some national 
service. 
     
46. All female citizens 
should be required to 
do some national 
service 
     
47. I am proud of the 
men and women who 
serve in the military. 
     
48.  I have confidence 
in the ability of our 
military to perform 
well in wartime. 
     
49. The U.S. Armed 
Forces are attracting 
high-quality, 
motivated recruits.  
 
     
50. Even if civilian 
society did not always 
appreciate the 
essential military 
values of commitment 
and unselfishness, 
our armed forces 
could still maintain 
required traditional 
standards. 
     
51. The American 
people understand the 
sacrifices made by the 
people who serve in 
the U.S. military. 










52. I expect that ten 
years from now 
America will still have 
the best military in the 
world. 
     
 
 
53.  I would be disappointed if a child of mine joined the military.  
 
1. Agree strongly 
2. Agree somewhat 
3. Neutral 
4. Disagree somewhat  
5. Disagree strongly 
6. Don’t know 
 
54. How would you generally characterize your experience in the military? 
 
1. Very positive 
2. Somewhat positive 
3. Mixed 
4. Somewhat negative 
5. Very negative 
6. Don’t know 
 
55.  How would you characterize your primary motivation to join the military? Please check the 
one closest to your primary motive. 
 
1. To gain skills valued in the civilian job market  
2. To have a career in the military  
3. To earn veteran's benefits  
4. To serve my country  
5. To get an education 
6. There were no other options 
7. Other (please specify) 











56.  I would leave military service if: (Please circle all that apply)  
 
1. The senior uniformed leadership does not stand up for what is right in military policy 
2. The country does not provide adequate facilities and weapons for the military to succeed 
3. The pay and benefits further lagged behind compensation in civilian economy  
4. There are reduced opportunities to train in my military specialty  
5. Deployment schedules keep me away from my family too much  
6. Chances for promotion were less than they are now in my service  
7. The challenge and sense of fulfillment I derive from my service were less      
8. Other (please specify) 
9. Don’t know 
  
 
57. Morale in my service is 
 




5. Very high 
6. No opinion  
 
Now, I’d like to ask a few questions to gather some background information. 
 





What is the highest level of education that you have obtained?  
1. Some High School 
2. High school 
3. Some college 
4. College graduate 
5. Some graduate work 
6. Graduate degree  
 





During what years have you been/were you on active military service? 











In which service are you presently serving or were serving upon leaving active military service? 
1. Army 
2. Navy 
3. Air Force 
4. Marines 
5. Coast Guard 
6. Army National Guard 
7. Air National Guard 
8. Army Reserve 
9. Navy Reserve 
10. Air Force Reserve 
11. Marine Corps Reserve 
12. Coast Guard Reserve  
 




































What is/was your primary arm or specialty? 
  
1. Law enforcement (USA 31) (USN MA) (USMC 58) 
2. Logistics/supply/transport (USA 88, 89, 92) (USN CS, SH, SK) (USMC 04, 30, 31, 33, 
34, 35, 65, 66, 70, 
3. Technical/equipment maintenance (USA 45, 52, 63, 94) (USN FC, ST, ET) (USMC 11, 
21, 28, 60/61/62) 
4. Administrative/Combat service support (legal, admin, finance, public affairs, medical, 
recruiting, religious) (USA 27, 41, 42, 44, 46, 68, 79, 56) (USN YN, PS) (USMC 01, 43, 
44, 46, 55, 68, 80) 
5. Chem/PsyOp/Civil Affairs (USMC 05, 57) 
6. Combat arms or platform (including aircraft, vehicles, ships/craft) (USA 11, 13, 14, 18, 
19, 21, 72, 73) (USN Aviation ratings, Engineering ratings, hull/deck ratings, 
construction ratings) (USMC 03, 08, 13, 18, 23, 73) 
7. Intelligence/cryptology (USA 96, 97, 98) (USN IS, CT) (USMC 02, 26, 27) 
8. Shipboard operations/deck operations (USN OS, BM) 
9. Communications/IT/Signal (USA 25, 33) (USN IT) (USMC 06, 28) 
10. Other (Please specify) ___________________________ 
 
 
Have you deployed abroad for a military operation with the U.S. armed forces since September 










How would you describe your political views?  
 
1. Very liberal 
2. Somewhat liberal 
3. Middle of the road 
4. Somewhat conservative 
5. Very conservative 









Generally speaking, how do you think of yourself politically? 
 
1. Strong Republican 
2. Moderate Republican 
3. Lean slightly more to the Republicans 
4. Independent 
5. Lean slightly more to the Democrats 
6. Moderate Democrat 
7. Strong Democrat 
8. Don’t know 
9. Other (please specify) ____________________ 
 
 Has your party identification changed over the past seven years? 
 
1. No  
2. Yes  
3. Don’t know  
 
Since the events of 9/11 and the U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, would you say that 
you: 
 
1. Are more strongly Democrat than before 
2. Are less strongly Democrat than before 
3. Are more strongly Republican than before 
4. Are less strongly Republican than before 
5. Switched from Democrat to Republican 
6. Switched from Republican to Democrat 
7. Are more strongly Independent than before 
8. Are less strongly Independent than before 
9. Haven’t moved/Don’t know 
 
What is the highest level of education that your father obtained?  
 
1. Less than high school 
2. High school  
3. Some college 
4. College graduate 
5. Some graduate work  
6. Graduate degree  











What is the highest level of education that your mother obtained?  
 
1. Less than high school 
2. High school  
3. Some college 
4. College graduate 
5. Some graduate work  
6. Graduate degree  
7. Don’t know 
 
Where did you live most of the time when you were growing up? 
 
_______________ (list state or territory)  
I moved around a lot 
Lived outside the U.S. 
Don’t know 
 
What is your racial/ethnic identity?  
 
1. White or Caucasian (not Hispanic) 
2. Hispanic 
3. Asian-American  
4. Black or African American (not Hispanic) 
5. American Indian, Eskimo or Aleut 
6. Prefer not to answer 
7. Other (specify) _____________________ 
 
What is your gender?  
  
     1 male  













Appendix B: Survey Codebook 
VAR  VAR LABEL   
Q00a  RESPONDANT SERIAL NR  Sequential serial number in order of receipt    
Q00b  HOW COMPLETED  1. Hand
2. Electronic 
 
Q00c  DATE COMPLETED  MM/DD/YYYY  


















Q04a  MIL HONEST  1. Applies
2. Does Not Apply 
 
Q04b  CIV HONEST  1. Applies
2. Does Not Apply 
 
Q05a  MIL INTOLERANT  1. Applies
2. Does Not Apply 
 
Q05b  CIV INTOLERANT  1. Applies
2. Does Not Apply 
 
Q06a  MIL MATERIALISTIC  1. Applies
2. Does Not Apply 
 
Q06b  CIV MATERIALISTIC  1. Applies
2. Does Not Apply 
 
Q07a  MIL CORRUPT  1. Applies
2. Does Not Apply 
 















Q08b  CIV GENEROUS  1. Applies
2. Does Not Apply 
 
Q09a  MIL SELFINDULGENT  1. Applies
2. Does Not Apply 
 
Q09b  CIV SELFINDULGENT  1. Applies
2. Does Not Apply 
 
Q10a  MIL HARDWORK  1. Applies
2. Does Not Apply 
 
Q10b  CIV HARDWORK  1. Applies
2. Does Not Apply 
 
Q11a  MIL RIGID  1. Applies
2. Does Not Apply 
 
Q11b  CIV RIGID  1. Applies
2. Does Not Apply 
 
Q12a  MIL DISCIPLINE  1. Applies
2. Does Not Apply 
 
Q12b  CIV DISCIPLINE  1. Applies
2. Does Not Apply 
 
Q13a  MIL CREATIVE  1. Applies
2. Does Not Apply 
 
Q13b  CIV CREATIVE  1. Applies
2. Does Not Apply 
 








Q15a  MIL OVERCAUTIOUS  1. Applies
2. Does Not Apply 
 



















Q17  WOMEN ENTERING WORKPLACE  1. Isn’t happening 
2. No effect 
3. Somewhat hurts 
4. Greatly hurts 
5. Don’t know 
 
























Q22  NONMIL IN MIL AFFAIRS  1. Isn’t happening 
2. No effect 
3. Somewhat hurts 
4. Greatly hurts 
5. Don’t know 
 






Q24  OLD FASHIONED MORALS  1. Isn’t happening 
2. No effect 
3. Somewhat hurts 
4. Greatly hurts 




























































































































































































































































































































Q58  YEAR OF BIRTH  YYYY  






Q61  LEVEL OF EDUCATION  1. Some High School 
2. GED 
3. High School graduate 
4. Some college 
5. College graduate 
6. Some graduate work 












































































































































































































































Appendix C: Active-duty Military Home of Record (HOR) Population 
by State as a Percentage of the Voting Eligible Population (VEP) 
State HOR Total VEP DOD Pct
Unknown28 390,253
Alabama 21,502 3,298,398 0.65%
Alaska 2,965 444,473 0.67%
Arizona 19,174 3,508,505 0.55%
Arkansas 9,837 1,958,922 0.50%
California 103,472 20,979,660 0.49%
Colorado 15,415 3,139,806 0.49%
Connecticut 7,079 2,465,669 0.29%
Delaward 2,251 579,294 0.39%
District of Columbia 1,458 438,201 0.33%
Florida 66,050 11,546,914 0.57%
Georgia 34,030 5,781,729 0.59%
Hawaii 5,125 887,931 0.58%
Idaho 5,764 947,302 0.61%
Illinois 35,053 8,810,724 0.40%
Indiana 17,914 4,510,774 0.40%
Iowa 8,466 2,174,806 0.39%
Kansas 9,452 1,890,455 0.50%
Kentucky 11,847 3,042,613 0.39%
Louisiana 19,341 3,219,060 0.60%
Maine 5,229 1,023,903 0.51%
Maryland 19,028 3,759,694 0.51%
Massachusetts 12,084 4,603,023 0.26%
Michigan 28,417 7,292,820 0.39%
Minnesota 10,797 3,682,001 0.29%
Mississippi 11,747 2,074,244 0.57%
Missouri 19,626 4,133,315 0.47%
Montana 5,225 708,691 0.74%
Nebraska 6,066 1,223,642 0.50%
Nevada 6,945 1,495,627 0.46%
New Hampshire 4,257 963,569 0.44%
New Jersey 19,666 5,637,378 0.35%
New Mexico 7,649 1,310,252 0.58%
New York 53,492 12,958,958 0.41%
North Carolina 31,456 5,995,045 0.52%
North Dakota 2,056 484,526 0.42%
                                                 
 
 
28 The Unknowns in this table are all United States Air Force personnel.  During the time period from 









Ohio 35,741 8,471,152 0.42%
Oklahoma 14,399 2,495,323 0.58%
Oregon 13,184 2,626,437 0.50%
Pennsylvania 36,725 9,273,421 0.40%
Rhode Island 2,547 744,909 0.34%
South Carolina 20,314 3,069,791 0.66%
South Dakota 3,082 563,178 0.55%
Tennessee 17,908 4,306,650 0.42%
Texas 94,385 13,890,814 0.68%
Utah 5,709 1,518,074 0.38%
Vermont 1,766 474,713 0.37%
Virginia 33,160 5,240,509 0.63%
Washington 23,365 4,276,814 0.55%
West Virginia 6,715 1,419,464 0.47%
Wisconsin 14,225 3,930,978 0.36%
Wyoming 2,793 378,135 0.74%
























Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force 
E-1 Private 
 
Seaman Recruit Private Airman Basic 





E-3 Private First 
Class 






Corporal Senior Airman 
E-5 Sergeant Petty Officer 
Second Class 
Sergeant Staff Sergeant 
E-6 Staff Sergeant Petty Officer 
First Class 
Staff Sergeant Technical 
Sergeant 






































Appendix E: Communication in Support of Research 
 
      October 13, 2008 
Dr. Chu, 
In conjunction with the University of Texas, I am conducting research into the political 
attitudes and behavior of American military enlisted personnel.  As you know, Dr. Peter 
Feaver has done extensive research into officers, but little valid data has been collected 
with respect to enlisted personnel 
I have developed an online survey and would like to reach at least 4,000 respondents.  If 
this is possible, I would be happy to talk with your point of contact, show and discuss 
the proposed survey, and make any modifications you deem necessary to ensure it is 
compliant with the law and regulation. 
Don Inbody 
Captain Donald S. Inbody, USN (Ret) 
Department of Political Science 
Texas State University 
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